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This study was motivated by the fact that Ghanaian cocoa producers face lower yields than 
other main cocoa producing counties which in turn increases food insecurity for smallholder 
producers. In addition, low yields experienced by Ghanaian producers is a  driving factor for 
forest degradation and deforestation as cocoa producers encroach further into previously 
undisturbed forests in efforts to increase their incomes. There are currently production methods 
to achieve higher yields readily available in Ghana; however, many producers choose not to 
adopt these methods because they are seen as too risky, or simply cannot adopt them due to 
financial/credit constraints. A common rationale for producers not adopting new technologies is 
that smallholder producers are risk averse and find it difficult to risk the little capital they may 
have. Smallholder producers frequently forego opportunities because they are vulnerable to 
adverse shocks such as crop failure that can move them into or deeper into poverty. Crop 
insurance could mitigate these risks but there is currently no crop insurance available for cocoa 
in Ghana. The Climate-Smart Cocoa (CSC) Working Group has proposed offering crop 
insurance for producers who follow the practices of CSC. This study estimated the average 
yields and yield variation (risk) between two groups of producers: (1) those who followed CSC 
practices: have training for efficient agrochemical input usage, used inorganic fertilizer, and 
practiced shade management (appendix 5) and (2) those who did not use CSC practices: no 
input-use training, no shade management, but did use inorganic fertilizer.  The objectives of this 
study were: (1) to estimate yield differences among producers who follow CSC and non-CSC 
practices (2) estimate the impact of CSC practices on risk (i.e. yield variation) using percent 
chance of indemnity payments to producers and relative standard deviation of yield as 
measurements, and (3) estimate potential revenue gains through following CSC practices. To 
 
 
investigate these objectives, a regression model was estimated to predict cocoa yields using 
historical yield for 19 districts in Ghana for the copping seasons of 2010-2011 and 2011-2012.  
Regression results were then used to identify average yields at the district level, yield variance, 
and fair-market premiums for producers who followed CSC practices and those who did not in 
19 districts of Ghana. The results of the study show that producers who followed the CSC 
recommended practices had higher yields, less risk, and higher gross revenue in every district of 
the study. Meaning, producers can obtain higher incomes by following CSC on lands that are 
already under cocoa cultivation as well as income stability through crop insurance. By obtaining 
these benefits, producers are not allowed to encroach into undisturbed forests and remain in the 
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Agriculture plays an important role in Ghana’s economy, representing 21.5 percent of total 
GDP and 56 percent of the total labor force in 2013, including many smallholder farmers who 
are responsible for 80 percent of Ghana’s agricultural production (CIA, 2014; Stutley, 2010). 
Approximately 54 percent of rural households in Ghana depend upon agriculture as their main 
livelihood (World Bank, 2008). Cocoa (Theobroma Cacao) is both the largest share of 
agricultural GDP and largest agricultural export in Ghana. Along with gold and remittances, 
cocoa is a top source of foreign exchange in Ghana (CIA, 2014). In 2011, Ghana exported a total 
of 697,236 tons of cocoa beans with a value of more than $2.2 billion USD, second only in the 
export of cocoa beans to Côte d’Ivoire on the international market (FAO, 2014a). 
Ghana’s large cocoa exports were obtained in spite of having one of the lowest yields per 
hectare in the world, less than 400 kg ha
-1
 (Dormon, Van Huis, Leeuwis, Obeng-Ofori, & Sakyi-
Dawson, 2004; Ruf & Schroth, 2004; Stutley, 2010) as compared to neighboring Côte d’Ivoire 
where producers yield twice that amount; 800 kg ha
-1 
(Dormon et al., 2004). On-farm factors are 
responsible for low yields including the incidence of disease and pests; failure to adopt research 
recommendations such as adopting high-yielding hybrid varieties, control of capsids and insects 
with proper pesticide usage, shade management, and weed control; a low producer price, and an 
insufficient extension system (Dormon et al., 2004). Failure to adopt the recommended research 
procedures, such as inorganic fertilizer use, could be a result of limited access and or availability 
of fertilizer as well as producers not having access to credit. A study commissioned by 
Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) and the Ghana Ministry of Food and 
Agriculture was conducted in Ghana in 2009 which showed that the majority of cocoa farmers 
did not have access to credit: seven percent had reported receiving a formal loan through a bank 
or credit union in the previous three years (2007-2009) and only 32.5 percent had received credit 
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through informal sources. In total, credit was unavailable to more than 60 percent of cocoa 
farmers in Ghana during the three years of this study, 2007-2009 (Panin & Asante, 2009). 
However, even if credit was available, there are no guarantees that producers would take 
advantage of it as interest rates in low-income countries can be prohibitively high with large 
percentage of collateral needed as well. Poor landowners tend to be risk averse because they are 
the most vulnerable to adverse shocks (i.e. crop failure) that can move a household deeper into 
poverty from which they cannot easily escape from (IFAD, 2011a; Todaro & Smith, 2012; 
World Bank, 2014). The avoidance of adverse shocks typically equates to foregone opportunities 
(higher yields/incomes) for smallholder producers (Cole, Giné, & Vickery, 2013; Dercon & 
Christiaensen, 2011; Dercon, Gunning, & Zeitlin, 2011; IFAD, 2011a; Karlan, Osei, Osei-Akoto, 
& Udry, 2012; Morduch, 1995).  
Historically, increased country cocoa production in Ghana had been the result of producers 
who had encroached further into virgin forests (Ruf & Schroth, 2004). Problems of 
encroachment have largely been driven by local land shortages as well as diminished 
productivity on cocoa farms as a result of diseases such as the fungal disease black pod 
(Phytophthora megakarya) and cocoa swollen shoot virus (CSSV) of the genus badnavirus 
(Berry, 1992). Moreover, producers opt to encroach into forests and make use of forest rent, the 
nutrient stock that has built up on the forest floor through time, rather than replant cocoa trees on 
existing farms (Ruf & Schroth, 2004; Ruf & Zadi, 1998). Cocoa is traditionally a shade crop, 
grown in the understory of a forest. Shade is important for cocoa trees because it helps to 
regulate solar radiation, air movement, and temperature. Cocoa trees are sensitive to all of these 
factors, especially at a young age (Wood & Lass, 1985). However, the introduction of new 
varieties in the 1950s that performed well in direct sunlight promoted the expansive practices of 
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cocoa production in Ghana because the new varieties were not as sensitive to radiation, air 
movement, and temperature (Ruf & Schroth, 2004). This eliminated the need for shade trees and 
accelerated the problems facing Ghana’s forests today of forest degradation and deforestation 
(Ruf & Konan, 2001; Ruf & Schroth, 2004; Ruf, 2011).  
One way to mitigate forest degradation and deforestation is through the implementation of 
Climate-Smart Agriculture (CSA). The FAO (2013) defined climate-smart agriculture as, 
“agriculture that sustainably increases productivity, resilience (adaptation), reduces/removes 
greenhouse gases (mitigation), and enhances achievement of national food security and 
development goals.” These practices have been adapted to cocoa, known as Climate-Smart 
Cocoa (CSC). The CSC approach to agriculture is endorsed by the Ghanaian Government and 
promoted by the Climate-Smart Cocoa Working Group which was established in 2011 (NCRC, 
2012). CSC is a holistic approach to agriculture with four fundamental elements: (1) access to 
extension services and financial credit, (2) access to crop insurance with premiums that are paid 
through funds obtained through a carbon fund, (3) land use planning, and (4) data management 
and management, reporting, and verification (MRV). The first element of CSC, access to 
extension services and credit, is already available through other projects that exist in Ghana such 
as the Cocoa Abrabopa Association and Cocoa Livelihood Project (CLP) (R. A. Asare, 2014; 
WCF, 2014b). However, there is concern that only raising farm yields will not only fail to 
mitigate deforestation but could actually enhance it (R. A. Asare, 2014).  
For this reason, the other elements are crucial in the success of CSC. All three remaining 
elements relate in some way to carbon funds such as the United Nation’s Reducing Emissions 
from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) collaborative initiative in low-income 
countries. REDD+ has a goal to significantly reduce emissions from deforestation and 
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degradation (UN-REDD, 2011). Without proper land use planning and MRV, funds cannot be 
obtained through programs such as REDD+ as they require accurate accounting in carbon stocks. 
The funds that can potentially be obtained through a carbon stock could then be used to pay for 
crop insurance for the cocoa producers who follow CSC practices (R. A. Asare, 2014). It is 
through this holistic approach, including crop insurance, that deforestation can be mitigated 
while raising cocoa yields for Ghanaian producers through access to credit, access to inputs, and 
input use training. 
One difficulty facing the holistic approach of CSC is that traditional crop insurance products 
can be expensive and many programs which are widely adopted, like those being offered in the 
United States, depend heavily upon subsidies from government (Barnett & Coble, 1999; USDA, 
2011). In countries such as Ghana where a large portion of the population is still engaged in 
subsistence agriculture, subsidies are a problem for two main reasons: (1) it introduces 
inefficiencies in agricultural markets such as production of crops in ill-suited regions and (2) 
governments cannot consistently maintain the subsidies (Linnerooth-Bayer, Mechler, & 
Hochrainer-Stigler, 2011). Efforts have been made to develop new insurance products that are 
more affordable for low-income countries. One such product is weather-based index insurance 
(WII) that uses a proxy variable such as rainfall to determine when yields are low enough to 
initiate a payment from the insurer to the insured (IFAD, 2011b; Roberts, 2005; Stutley, 2010). 
This method reduces transaction costs compared to traditional insurance policies lime multiple-
peril crop insurance (MPCI) because it does not require that an insurance adjuster from the 
insurance provider make any on-farm assessments (Stutley, 2010). As reduction in transaction 
costs are achieved the cost of an insurance premium (amount paid from the insured to the insurer 
to receive coverage from an insurance product) reduces and becomes closer to the cost of 
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indemnity payments (amount paid from the insured to the insurer in the event of a loss). The 
situation where insurance premiums are equal to indemnity payments can be referred to as a fair-
market premium.  
This study identifies fair-market premiums at two different coverage levels for 19 districts in 
Ghana for two groups of cocoa producers: (1) those who followed CSC practices: have 
undergone input-use training, used inorganic fertilizer, and practiced shade management 
(appendix 5) and (2) those who did not use CSC practices: no input-use training, no shade 
management, but did use inorganic fertilizer. Regression analysis was performed using 
household-level data on input use, production, and farm characteristics provided from the World 
Cocoa Foundation (WCF) as part of their cocoa livelihood program (CLP). Data for cocoa in 
West Africa is scarce and the data used in this study are unique because it provides large spatial 
coverage with a sample size of 1,200 households in 108 villages, 19 districts, and five regions. 
The uniqueness of this study is further enhanced through the use of daily precipitation data 
provided by Awhere Incorporated. Precipitation data were available at a five arc-minute 
resolution; approximately equal to an on-the-ground weather station positioned every nine 
kilometers in Ghana. These unique data were then used to perform a regression analysis with 
cocoa yield (kg ha
-1
) as the dependent variable. Regression results were used to simulate yields 
in @RISK (Palisade Corporation, 2014) for Ghanaian cocoa producers at the district level. The 
objectives of this study were: (1) to investigate yield differences among producers who follow 
CSC and non-CSC practices (2) investigate the impact of CSC practices on risk using percent 
chance of indemnity payments to producers and relative standard deviation as measurements, 
and (3) investigate potential revenue gains through following CSC practices.  
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II. Literature Review 
A. Cocoa in Africa 
Successful Cocoa (Theobroma Cacao) cultivation first occurred in West Africa in 1822 when 
production was introduced to the small island of Príncipe. From there, cultivation spread to other 
islands in the archipelago: São Tomé in 1830 and Bioko in 1854 (Nava, 1953). Cocoa cultivation 
in São Tomé depended heavily on labor from Angola and Nigeria. As such, Fernando Po 
eventually introduced cocoa cultivation to Nigeria in 1874 (Ayorinde, 1966). While widespread 
cocoa cultivation failed to develop in Nigeria, cultivation was more widely accepted when the 
amazon-basin originating amelonado cocoa bean was introduced to Ghana in 1879 (Ayorinde, 
1966). Although cocoa cultivation had been previously introduced to Ghana by Basel 
missionaries as early as 1815 (Cocobod, 2014), it was met with little success (Wanner, 1962). 
Much of Ghana’s success in cocoa was a result of its ambitious farmers who were already well 
versed in the ways of commercial markets and trade through their experience with palm oil, oil 
palm kernels, and rubber (Berry, 1992). With their experience, farmers quickly accepted and 
expanded the cultivation of cocoa and developed cocoa trade (Hill, 1963).   
West Africa was responsible for approximately 63 percent of cocoa production in the world 
in 2012, representing four of the top five largest cocoa-producing countries: (1) Côte d'Ivoire, 
approximately 33 percent of global production; (3) Ghana, approximately 18 percent of global 
production; (4) Nigeria, approximately eight percent of global production; and (5) Cameroon; 
approximately five percent of global production  (FAO, 2014b). A map of African cocoa-





Figure 1. Cocoa-growing regions of Africa (FAO, 2014b) 
 
B. Cocoa in Ghana 
Cocoa was originally cultivated in Ghana, named the Gold Coast at the time, in the Akwapim 
Mountains located in the Eastern Region. From there  cultivation began a westward migration in 
1892 and by 1910 was widely adopted throughout the southern tropical portion of Ghana (Hill, 
1963). Adoption and expansion was so successful that for a time, Ghana was the world’s largest 
exporter of cocoa (Berry, 1992). In the 1920s there was an endemic outbreak of cocoa swollen 
shoot virus (CSSV) of the genus badnavirus in the Eastern Region. The outbreak in Ghana in 
1936 was the first instance of CSSV ever reported and the disease is still endemic to Ghana and 
Nigeria (Wood & Lass, 1985). CSSV is spread by mealy bugs,  Planococcus citri (Wood & Lass, 
1985) and can kill the amazon-basin originating variety Amelonado seedling within a few 
months of infection (Wilson, 1999). There is no cure for the virus and the disease can only be 
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managed through the destruction of virus sources (infected trees) although some attempts have 
been made to control the disease vector (mealy bugs) with no success (Wood & Lass, 1985). The 
CSSV outbreak reduced production in the Eastern Region and promoted the westward expansion 
of cocoa cultivation in Ghana (Berry, 1992). The spread of cultivation followed the moist semi-
deciduous forest of the Brong-Ahafo and Ashanti Regions as the climate, particularly 
precipitation, were optimal for cocoa production (Berry, 1992). The importance of precipitation 
on cocoa farms is of special importance in Ghana, and globally, because most farms do not have 
irrigation systems. A recent study conducted in Ghana that spanned 2,810 households, 335 
villages, and all five regions that were used in this study found that 94 percent of all cocoa farms 
surveyed did not have irrigation (Hainmueller, Hiscox, & Tampe, 2011). Furthermore there are 
only 30,000 ha of irrigated croplands in Ghana; which represents one half of one percent of total 





Figure 2. Political boundaries of cocoa-growing regions of Ghana 















Cocoa Seasons in Ghana 
Before a cocoa tree can produce a pod (which contains the cocoa beans), the cocoa flower 
must first be pollinated and the pod must mature (D R Glendinning, 1972; Wood & Lass, 1985). 
In Ghana, the flowering period occurs roughly from early January to late May and the pod 
maturation period occurs roughly from early June to late October. The main harvest period for 
cocoa generally occurs from early September to late February of the following year. In addition 
to the main cocoa harvest, a minor or light harvest also occurs from mid-May to mid-July 
(personal communication Dr. S.T. Ampofo, Cocoa Abrabopa Association ). Cocoa pods require 
approximately five months to mature for harvest (D R Glendinning, 1972). As such, the main 
harvest period corresponds with the rainy season of southern Ghana which typically begins in 
April. Preferred cocoa-growing precipitation is between 1,500 mm and 2,000 mm per annum 
(ICCO, 2013). Annual precipitation below 1,250 mm is unfavorable because the tropical 
temperatures (also required for cocoa production) cause evaporation from the tree to be greater 
than the precipitation received in this environment (Wood & Lass, 1985). Additionally, annual 
precipitation above 2,500 mm greatly increases the incidence of fungal diseases such as black 
pod, Phytophthora megakarya, and witches’ broom, Crinipellis pernicosa formerly known as 
Marasmius pernicosa (Wood & Lass, 1985). From a physiology standpoint, cocoa also requires 

















Cocoa Production Trends in Ghana 
After more than a half-century of production, Ghana reached a production peak of 580,000 
tons in 1965, but by 1977, production had fallen to a low of 324,000 tons (FAO, 2014b). A major 
reason noted for the decline was that many trees had been planted 30-40 years previously and 
were past their most productive stages (Amanor, 1996). Cocoa is most productive (from a yield 
standpoint) between 15 and 25 years after planting, although cocoa may have a profitable 
lifespan of 50 years, yield declines and production cost increases are both realized in the 26
th
 
year (Montgomery, 1981). The World Bank (1975) cited five primary reasons for Ghanaian 
producers’ unwillingness to invest in cocoa at the time of their study: (1) low producer price set 
by the government, (2) lack of technical assistance to producers, (3) inadequacy of input 
distribution system for agro-chemical inputs, (4) excessive amount of over-aged trees, and (5) 
the lack of a comprehensive development plan for the cocoa sector. 
The declining cocoa production in Ghana was recognized by the Ghanaian government when 
in 1970 the government was issued an $8.5 million USD loan from the World Bank to inject 
capital in to a diminishing cocoa sector. From 1970 to 1975 money was used to replant and 
rehabilitate  35,207 hectares of cocoa in Suhum that had been neglected or abandoned after the 
CSSV endemic (World Bank, 1975). 
After the rehabilitation efforts were complete in the Suhum region, a similar project was 
initiated in the Ashanti Region. In 1975, a total of 12,140 hectares of cocoa farms were replanted 
at a cost of $14 million USD which was again acquired through a World Bank loan (World 
Bank, 1975). The report that was constructed at the conclusion of the Ashanti project cited many 
troubles that are still facing the cocoa industry today. These troubles include extension systems 
with low saturation, low yield, aged trees, and minimal input usage for items such as fertilizer.  
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Despite the difficulties facing the Ghanaian cocoa industry, Ghana was still the third largest 
producer of cocoa in the world in 2012 (FAO, 2014b). This production level was achieved in 
Ghana with a yield of less than half that of neighboring Côte d’Ivoire: less than 400 kg ha 
-1
 and 
800 kg ha 
-1
, respectively (Dormon et al., 2004). Dorman et al. (2004) attributed the low yields to 
incidence of disease and pests, failure to adopt research recommendations, a low producer price, 
and an insufficient extension system. The responses from government and non-governmental 
agencies (NGOs) to address these deficiencies in the cocoa sector include improving access to 
high-yielding hybrid cocoa varieties, providing trainings and information to farmers, and 
providing farmers with access to credit for inputs (R. A. Asare, 2014). 
 
C. World Cocoa Foundation Cocoa Livelihoods Program 
One existing program that attempts to address these deficiencies is the Cocoa Livelihoods 
Program (CLP) from the World Cocoa Foundation (WCF). The program provides training and 
information to farmers as well as providing them with access to credit. WCF is an NGO based 
out of Washington DC, with financial support from its cocoa industry members. WCF has 
programs in Central and South America, Southeast Asia, and West Africa (Norton, Nalley, 
Dixon, & Popp, 2014). WCF was founded in 2000 with a commitment to creating a sustainable 
cocoa economy by putting farmers first, promoting agricultural and environmental stewardship, 
and strengthening development in communities that produce cocoa (WCF, 2014a). One way in 
which WCF has worked towards these commitments is through the implementation of the CLP 
program in 2009 (WCF, 2014b). Since 2009,  the CLP has operated in five West African 
countries: (1) Cameroon, (2) Côte d’Ivoire, (3), Ghana, (4) Liberia, and (5) Nigeria (WCF, 
2014b). The program has three main objectives: (1) Improve marketing efficiency in the cocoa 
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sector; (2) improve on-farm cocoa production, efficiency, and quality; and (3) improve the 
competitiveness of farmers on diversified cocoa farms (WCF, 2014b).  
An integral part of CLP’s efforts to meet these objectives has been to offer training programs 
to farmers. Three such programs were offered: (1) farmer field school (FFS), (2) farmer business 
school (FBS), and (3) input promoter (IP) (Norton et al., 2014) . In Ghana, these training 
programs were taught by different CLP-partner organizations. Two of the three programs focus 
on agronomics while the other focuses on the business aspects of cocoa production. FBS was 
taught by Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) and has a primary goal of 
changing the producer’s perception from farming as a lifestyle to farming as a business. They 
provided the financial tools necessary to balance a budget as well as providing an understanding 
of financial services available  (Norton et al., 2014). The other two training programs were 
taught by the Ghana Cocoa Board (Cocobod). Cocobod is the sole exporter of cocoa in Ghana 
and is also responsible for subsidies (agro-inputs: fertilizer, pesticide, fungicide) and cocoa 
extension services to Ghanaian cocoa producers (Kolavalli & Vigneri, 2011).The first training 
program of CLP, FFS, focused on improving basic agronomic skills to better manage the health 
of cocoa trees. The training program provides information on pest and disease management, 
replanting, estimating farm size, safety practices, pruning techniques, fermentation methods, and 
fertilizer use (Norton et al., 2014). The third and final training program, IP, is also taught by 
Cocobod. During this capstone course, producers use the skills that they have gained from FFS 
and FBS and proceed with IP to learn more about efficient and effective agro-chemical input use. 
Upon completion of the IP training, farmers should know proper farm management techniques, 
how to budget properly and coordinate financial resources, and how to safely use chemical 
inputs. Furthermore, upon successful completion producers qualify for credit through the CLP 
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program (Norton et al., 2014). Results of Norton et al. (2014) show that the CLP, and in 
particular IP training had been successful in increasing yields for targeted cocoa producers in 
Ghana by 75.24 percent. By the end of phase one of the CLP program, a total of 106,000 farmers 
have been trained throughout participating West African nations: Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, 
Ghana, Liberia, and Nigeria (WCF, 2014b). Although CLP addresses many of the problems 
facing cocoa producers today it fails to address one of the largest environmental problems facing 
the cocoa industry today, deforestation. 
 
D. Deforestation in Ghana 
Agroforesty, a system in which trees and shrubs remain alongside agricultural crops can be 
useful in managing climate and pests when applied to cocoa production (R. Asare & David, 
2011). For example, shade trees on a cocoa farm can support up to 180 different bird species that 
can help to control insects that spread disease (R. Asare & David, 2011). The effect of shade on 
cocoa is extremely complex as it affects several important factors in cocoa production: solar 
radiation, air movement, temperature, relative humidly, and soil moisture (Wood & Lass, 1985). 
A study conducted in Ghana by Murray (1954) found that cocoa yields without nitrogen fertilizer 
had increased when light levels were decreased up to 50 percent. However, after 50 percent 
cocoa yields declined. This same study found that when nitrogen fertilizer was used that cocoa 
yields increased until the 75 percent light level where yields plateaued and then slightly 
decreased until full sun exposure (Murray, 1954). Subsequent studies also found that shade 
reduction increases yields when nitrogen fertilizer is applied (Ahenkorah, Akorifi, & Adri, 1974; 
Gockowski & Sonwa, 2008, 2011). Shade reduction increases cocoa yields because more leaves 
are produced higher sunlight which significantly stimulates flowering of the cocoa tree and 
results in more cocoa pods and thus more cocoa beans (Asomanin, Kwakwa, & Hutcheon, 1971; 
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Boyer, 1974; Cunningham, Smith, & Hurd, 1961). Producers’ yield gain from reduced shade is a 
driver of forest degradation and deforestation. Another driver is that producers encroach into 
forests in order use the nutrient stock that has built up on the forest floor through time, known as 
forest rent (Ruf and Schroth 2004; Ruf and Zadi 1998). 
Land tenure can also play a role in deforestation. In much of West Africa, including Ghana, a 
customary means of claiming land has been the doit d’hache, or, “right of the axe” (R. A. Asare, 
2010). Through this customary means, land and user rights to a bundle of resources can be 
obtained on lands through the act of clearing vegetation that currently resides on the lands and 
then planting trees or crops in place of the recently cleared vegetation (R. A. Asare, 2010).  
However, custom dictates that land cannot be claimed without proper authorization. For instance 
in share cropping, if lands are not cleared within a given time period the sharecropper’s right to 
the land is nullified (R. A. Asare, 2010). Besley (1995) argues that more secure land tenures 
should have a positive effect on tree planting. However, data from Ghana suggest that the 
security of land tenure does not play a significant role in willingness to plant tree crops (Otsuka, 
Quisumbing, Payongayong, & Aidoo, 2003). Meaning, even producers with less secure land 
tenure are willing clear lands and plant new trees such as cocoa.  
  Links between deforestation and cocoa were seen as early as the 1920s when farmers in São 
Tomé attempted to increase yields by reducing shade cover (Navel, 1921). The first substantial 
expansion of cocoa cultivation – and concurrently deforestation – in Ghana occurred in the 1930s 
and 1940s as farmers afflicted with CSSV abandoned their failing farms in the Eastern Region to 
move westward. From the Eastern Region, farmers followed the semi-deciduous forests – which 
were ideal for cocoa production – into the Ashanti Region and then the Brong-Ahafo Region. 
During the expansion of the 1930s and 1940s, production in the Eastern Region fell by 60 
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percent but those losses were largely offset by the new production in Ashanti and Brong-Ahafo 
(Berry, 1992). 
From the 1940s to the 1980s, the preferred means of cocoa production is what can be referred 
to as a ‘complex cocoa agroforest,’ meaning, cocoa is planted in the understory of a forest and 
then the canopy is thinned around the cocoa as it ages (Ruf, 2011). This practice is integrated 
with the forest system and likely prevailed because technologies, such as chainsaws, which made 
the removal of large trees much easier, were not yet available in Ghana. Until the 1950s, 
Amelonado and Trinitario cocoa were the only available varieties in Ghana. These varieties were 
prone to disease, took as long as eight years to bear fruit, and were resistant to few pests  (Edwin 
& Masters, 2005). New Amazonian varieties from Peru arrived in Ghana in the 1950s and 
outperformed locally-used varieties in time to bear fruit and disease resistance. Furthermore, the 
new varieties had the advantage of bearing fruit two times per year, provided overall higher 
yields, and performed very well in no-shade environments (Ruf & Schroth, 2004).  By 1961, an 
estimated 60,000 ha had already been planted to the recently introduced Amazonian varieties 
(Edwin & Masters, 2005; D. R. Glendinning & Edwards, 1962).  
Through the 1950s and 1960s, cocoa rose in popularity to become the most important cash 
crop in the agroforest system in Ghana. The movement of the farmers also brought about 
changes in economic, social, and environmental landscapes. In particular, increased competition 
among cocoa producers, localized land shortages, cocoa diseases, and fluctuations in the cocoa 
market drove farmers further and further into previously undisturbed remote forest landscapes to 
cultivate cocoa (Okali, 1983).  
Attempts to reduce pressures on forest landscapes occurred in the 1970s with World Bank 
projects to rehabilitate the depleted and mostly abandoned cocoa regions of Suhum and Ashanti. 
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By the start of the Ashanti project in 1975, cocoa cultivation was believed to occupy between 1.2 
– 1.8 million hectares and was responsible for employing around 2.5 million people; 25 percent 
of Ghana’s population (World Bank, 1975). Until this rehabilitation project, farmers’ responses 
to disease, land shortages, and other market factors was to encroach further into virgin forests 
(Ruf & Schroth, 2004).  
In the early 1980s, a series of subsequent drought years led to large-scale fires in 1983 
throughout forest reserves of the transitional zone of Ghana as well as cocoa-producing regions, 
commonly referred to as “bush fires”. These fires affected thousands of hectares of cocoa in the 
prime semi-deciduous forest belt  (Edwin & Masters, 2005), decreasing the area of land planted 
to cocoa in Ghana (figure 3). Amidst the environmental challenges being faced by cocoa 
producers, they were also faced with political challenges. During the same year as the bush fires, 
Ghana was also adopting an IMF structural adjustment program. As part of the program 
requirements, subsidies for fertilizers and pesticides were ended and cocoa extension services 
were eliminated for farmers (Edwin & Masters, 2005). In the absence of government assistance, 
cocoa farming became less profitable for many farmers, particularly those with older farms and 
as a result cocoa expansion declined (Benhin & Barbier, 2004). Many farms during this time 
diversified their agricultural production. Some farmers even opted to completely abandon cocoa 
and removed their trees. Others still moved in to growing other crops such as pineapple, banana, 
coconut, and oil palm (Amanor, 1996). During this period, production of cocoa fell to 158,000 




Figure 3. Cocoa yield and area harvested in Ghana (1961-2012) (FAO, 2014b) 
 
The waning of the cocoa industry leading up to the 1990s was met with intervention through 
the availability of new cocoa varieties and higher farm gate prices. With these interventions 
came a sharp increase in expansion (figure 3) particularly in the western portion of the country, 
including expansion in to moist evergreen forests that were not as well suited for cocoa 
production as the semi deciduous forests. Cocoa production saw increases of four percent per 
annum from the late 1980s to the early 2000s (Abenyega & Gockowski, 2003). 
Since 2000, production of cocoa has consistently increased in Ghana (FAO, 2014b). These 
increases in production are a combination of further expansion and higher yields (figure 3). 
However, the sharp increase in yields (calculated as country production divided by country area 
harvested) starting in 2010 could possibly have been attributed to smuggling of cocoa from 
neighboring Côte d’Ivoire. The New York-based firm Commodities Risk Analysis estimated that 
between 75,000 and 100,000 metric tons of cocoa beans were smuggled into Ghana from Côte 
d’Ivoire during the 2010 – 2011 harvest season (McLure, 2010). Historically, cocoa smuggling 












































































































approximately 20 percent of Ghana’s cocoa production being smuggled into Côte d’Ivoire in the 
1980s (Kolavalli & Vigneri, 2011). More recently, a higher producer price in Ghana and political 
unrest in Côte d’Ivoire has caused the flow of smuggled cocoa beans to be reversed (McLure, 
2010). Meaning, the yield increases shown in figure 3 are dubious. The area harvested for cocoa 
however is not. The expansion from the year 2000 onward has resulted in further forest 
degradation and deforestation and intrusion into forest reserves (R. A. Asare, 2014). Visual 
representation of deforestation in the west of Ghana, including parts of Western, Brong-Ahafo, 
and Ashanti Regions can be seen in figure 4. Major deforestation has occurred from 1986 to 
2011 (4.3 percent per annum), making this region a major focus for environmental ecosystem 
services (FCPF, 2014).  
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Opportunities exist to reduce forest degradation and deforestation in Ghana. One such 
example is the United Nation’s Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation 
(REDD+) collaborative initiative in low-income countries. REDD+ has a goal to significantly 
reduce emissions from deforestation and degradation (UN-REDD, 2011). Early in the stages of 
REDD+ readiness process, agriculture, and specifically cocoa production, had been found to be a 
significant factor in the growth of forest degradation and deforestation in Ghana (R. A. Asare, 
2014). While agriculture’s role in deforestation was recognized in Ghana, so too was the 
importance of agricultural income to smallholder farmers. The link with these two concepts as 
well as the realization of the role that smallholder agroforestry producers could play in carbon 
sequestration and abatement of deforestation/ degradation in the face of global climate change 
led to the creation of the Climate-Smart Cocoa Working Group (R. A. Asare, 2014). 
 
E. Climate-Smart Cocoa 
Climate-smart cocoa (CSC) is an extension of climate-smart agriculture (CSA). The FAO 
(2013) defined climate-smart agriculture as, “agriculture that sustainably increases productivity, 
resilience (adaptation), reduces/removes greenhouse gases (mitigation), and enhances 
achievement of national food security and development goals.” The pillars of climate-smart 
agriculture are presented in figure 5. CSA practices have economic and environmental benefits 
encompassed in a forward-looking approach in order to not only achieve gains, but also stability 
in food production and prices (FAO, 2013). Although the five pillars shown in figure 5 are 
crucial in the success of CSA, Asare (2014) argues that in the case of CSC, CSA initiatives also 
need to be linked by a network that provides access to financial, human, and social capital. 
Furthermore, for the recommended procedures of CSA to be adapted to CSC, risk mitigation 




Figure 5. Pillars of climate-smart agriculture (R. A. Asare, 2014). 
 
As the concept of CSA was gaining global recognition in 2010 and 2011, the Climate-Smart 
Cocoa Working Group was established to explore the application of climate-smart agriculture in 
Cocoa. The CSC working group was initiated by Forest Trends and their local partner in Ghana, 
the  Nature Conservation Research Centre (NCRC), with a goal to define strategies to reduce the 
illegal entry of cocoa farms into forest reserves (R. A. Asare, 2014). Over the next year, NCRC 
worked with partners from the private sector (cocoa buying companies, insurance companies, 
and banks) and the public sector to think critically about how to combat the problems of 

































































was a report entitled, “The Case and Pathway toward a Climate-Smart Future for Ghana” 
(NCRC, 2012). 
The CSC Working Group report concluded that cocoa production in Ghana was not on a 
sustainable course due to three primary factors: (1) changes in temperature and rainfall patterns 
due to climate change, (2) primary emphasis on intensification without thought of how 
production increases could further promote expansion and deforestation, and (3) a total lack of 
land use planning  (NCRC, 2012). In addition, the report made recommendations towards a 
“desired future state” of cocoa production and forest systems: (1) reduce the greenhouse gas 
emissions resulting from cocoa expansion into forests as well as the conversion of other lands 
with high to medium carbon stocks, (2) increase carbon stocks in low-shade cocoa production 
systems, (3) improve cocoa producer livelihoods by increasing cocoa yields and access to 
mitigation and adaptation benefits, (4) demonstrate the importance of land-use planning for CSC 
production at the community level, and (5) promote biodiversity and ecological resilience within 
cocoa-farming landscapes (NCRC, 2012). 
NCRC (2012) identified a holistic approach of five key areas of improvement that need to be 
implemented together in order to reach the desired future state of cocoa production in Ghana as, 
“(1) extension: enhance productivity and economic returns in CSA manner – inputs, extension 
services, best practices, and financial products, (2) credit: de-risk cocoa farming activities linked 
to CSA strategies through increased access to credit, (3) yield insurance: de-risk cocoa farming 
activities linked to CSA strategies through development of specialized cocoa farm insurance 
products, (4) landscape planning: reduce cocoa expansion into high carbon landscapes and 
increase carbon values on farm landscapes- test solution for land tenure and benefit sharing, and 
(5) measuring, reporting and verification (MRV): manage and link data related to CSA 
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approaches.” The first two elements of CSC, access to extension services and credit, are 
currently available through existing projects in Ghana such as the Cocoa Abrabopa Association 
and Cocoa Livelihood Project (CLP) (R. A. Asare, 2014; WCF, 2014b). However, the CSC 
Working Group is concerned that  only raising yields will not only fail to decrease deforestation 
and forest degradation but could even enhance it (R. A. Asare, 2014).  
The approach of CSC in Ghana varies slightly from the recommended CSA pillars in figure 
5. Specifically, the CSC approach focuses just on three of the five pillars: (1) mitigation 
combined with data management and MRV; (2) increased yield based upon accessible extension 
services, inputs, and risk-mitigation services as well as focus on growing cocoa in appropriate 
soil types; and (3) economic development that centers upon land-use planning (R. A. Asare, 
2014). In the case of CSC in Ghana, the remaining two pillars – food security and adaptation – 
are believed to result from the successful implementation of the other three pillars. 
Adaptation and mitigation strategies are of particular importance for a crop with such finite 
physiological constraints as cocoa. With the variability of rainfall and temperatures both likely to 
increase as a result of climate change, the need for the adaptation and mitigation techniques 
presented in CSC are becoming more urgent (R. A. Asare, 2014). Cocoa production systems that 
have little to no shade are more susceptible to reductions in rainfall and increases in temperature 
than complex agroforests (Anim-Kwapong & Fimpong, 2008). Furthermore, complex 
agroforests are diminishing in West Africa (Ruf & Schroth, 2004; Ruf, 2011) and forest 
degradation and deforestation persists throughout the high forest zone of Ghana as low- or no-
shade production systems are favored over complex agroforest (R. A. Asare, 2014). Shade-
grown cocoa can reduce the encroachment of cocoa farming into forests and other protected 
lands (R. Asare & David, 2011). Concurrently, demand for socially responsible cocoa, such as 
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fair-trade cocoa is increasing (FAO, 2009). In the USA, demand for socially-responsible cocoa 
caused imports of fair trade certified products to increase by 67% from 2009 to 2010 bringing the 
total imports of fair trade certified products from 2002 to 2010 to over 16 million pounds (Fair 
Trade USA, 2011).  
The demand for socially-responsible cocoa combined with the need to protect the forest 
landscapes of Ghana provides a unique opportunity for the Ghanaian cocoa industry to proceed 
with CSC. Implementation and adoption of CSC management practices need to occur at the farm 
level. For this adoption to take place, farm-level resources need to be available  (R. A. Asare, 
2014). These productivity increases of existing cocoa farms, coupled with community-based, 
landscape level land-use planning, can help to abate the expansive practices of converting forest 
landscapes to cocoa farms. The focus of this strategy is to provide producers with physical 
(distribution) and financial (credit) access to farm inputs such as chemical fertilizer, hybrid 
germplasms, and agro-chemicals in order to increase yields. Concurrently, as a way to provide 
incentives to follow these practices by mitigating the financial risks that producers may bear as a 
result of taking credit to purchase inputs, crop insurance needs to be provided to producers.  
Many of the recommended practices for CSC have been available to producers in Ghana for 
over 30 years (R. A. Asare, 2014). Although the practices have been available, the adoption has 
been low. Asare (2014) suggests three factors limiting adoption: (1) limited or absent extension 
and training opportunities, (2) costs and risks associated with the adoption of capital and labor 
intensive recommended practices with no yield guarantee, and (3) persistent lack of access to 
essential economic and agronomic resources. Therefore, to enable large-scale adoption,  CSC 
recommended practices need to be supported by access to credit, to afford inputs; training, to use 
inputs effectively and efficiently; and insurance, to mitigate risks associated with increased 
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expenditures on farm inputs (R. A. Asare, 2014). Most elements of the enabling 
recommendations are already available in Ghana, albeit on a limited scale and in isolation. The 
exception however is the absence of crop insurance for cocoa which is not currently available (R. 
A. Asare, 2014), and the absence of publically available, sector-wide data, hence a 
recommendation for improved data management and MRV. Data management and MRV are 
also important to access funds from REDD+ or ER-PIN as these programs require accurate 
carbon accounting to receive payment. The payments obtained through carbon funds are also 
important for crop insurance in CSC because the CSC Working Group suggests paying for 
insurance premiums for producers following CSC practices with the payments obtained from the 
carbon funds (NCRC, 2012). The CSC Working Group believes that by incentivizing producers 
to follow CSC practices with crop insurance, reduction in forest degradation and deforestation 
can be obtained (R. A. Asare, 2014). It is through this holistic approach to cocoa production in 
Ghana that deforestation can be mitigated while raising cocoa yields for Ghanaian producers 
through access to credit, access to inputs, access to crop insurance, and input use training. 
 
F. Crop Insurance 
Overview 
Crop insurance is a mechanism in which agricultural producers can attempt to mitigate risk. 
A consolidated glossary of risk management terms from the United States Department of 
Agriculture (USDA) Risk Management Agency (RMA) can be found in appendix 4. 
Generally, crop insurance can be divided into two main categories: crop yield insurance and 
crop revenue insurance (Barnett & Coble, 1999). In crop yield insurance, indemnities are paid to 
producers when crop yield falls below the insured yield level that is based upon actual 
production history (APH) (USDA, 2011). APH is used to determine the expected yield of the 
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producer by taking an average of at least four years of actual verifiable production records 
(Barnett & Coble, 1999). In the United States, when the producers’ own yields are not available 
an average of yields from neighboring areas are used (USDA, 2011). Crop revenue insurance is 
very similar to crop yield insurance but it also provides revenue protection by guaranteeing 
commodity prices (Barnett & Coble, 1999; USDA, 2011).  
In the United States, crop insurance is subsidized for coverage at the catastrophic level, 
known as CAT coverage (Barnett & Coble, 1999). Producers must pay an administrative fee to 
participate in CAT coverage but the government pays the entire premium (USDA, 2011). 
Producers have the option to purchase additional coverage beyond CAT coverage, which only 
guarantees 50 percent of average yield (Barnett & Coble, 1999). The premium on additional 
coverage - known as buy-up coverage – is partially paid by the producer but is still 50 percent 
subsidized by the government for most coverage levels in excess of 50 percent (USDA, 2011).  
Insurance products allow insured individuals to share risk with a large pool of other policy 
holders (Barnett & Coble, 1999). Risk can be either idiosyncratic or systemic (World Bank, 
2014). In agriculture, an idiosyncratic risk is an isolated weather event such as hail damage. If 
one farmer experiences losses as a result of hail it is highly unlikely than this weather event will 
be shared by many farmers in a region (Barnett & Coble, 1999). Systemic risk however is 
experienced by many farmers in a region. Systemic risks are weather events such as drought that 
affects entire regions rather than individual farmers (Barnett & Coble, 1999). Difficulties arise in 
crop insurance because many risks in agriculture are systemic (Barnett & Coble, 1999). 
The heterogeneous nature of risk (i.e idiosyncratic and systemic) means that not all risks are 
insurable. Rejda (1995) reports six conditions that experts have identified over time that make 
risk insurable: (1) Risk must have determinable and measurable loss. It must be possible to 
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determine the time and magnitude of a loss. (2) Risk must be pooled among a large, roughly 
homogenous group of individual exposure units. A large pool allows for more accurate 
prediction of expected losses through the statistical law of large numbers. (3) Only seemingly 
random occurrences of accidental and unintentional loss should be insured. (4) Risk should not 
have positive correlation across exposure units as it has the potential of catastrophic loss to the 
insurer. When positive correlation exists among exposure units the statistical law of large 
numbers does not hold because convergence does not occur to the expected sample mean when 
sequences of variables are not random. (5) The frequency and severity of a loss must be 
calculable to establish a premium rate. (6) The premium must be economically feasible so 
purchasers can afford the insurance product. In reality, insurance products deviate from these 
ideal conditions. For example, the systemic risk of weather events such as drought associated 
with crop insurance violates condition four (Barnett & Coble, 1999). 
To protect themselves against catastrophic losses, private insurance companies will typically 
load premium rates (i.e. charge in excess of costs) in order to build reserves to use in the event of 
indemnity payments exceeding premiums collected in a given year (Barnett & Coble, 1999). 
Other precautions are taken to ensure that the ideal conditions to insure risk hold. Moral hazard 
violates condition three. Moral hazard occurs when policyholders decisions become more risky 
and cause the chances of losses to increase as a result of purchasing insurance (Barnett & Coble, 
1999; IFAD, 2011b; Laffont, 1995; Roberts, 2005; World Bank, 2014). Deductibles and co-
payments are used to mitigate moral hazard (Barnett & Coble, 1999). A deductible is either set as 
a percentage of the insured sum or a set monetary amount. This is the first part of a claim for an 
indemnity payment and is paid by the policyholder (Roberts, 2005). A co-payment can be used 
in addition to a deductible and represents a percentage of a claim that the insured individual is 
28 
 
responsible for paying (Barnett & Coble, 1999). A more recent method for reducing moral 
hazard is the use of index-based insurance (IFAD, 2011b; Mobarak & Rosenzweig, 2013; Smith 
& Watts, 2009). Index insurance is a more recent type of insurance product that has indemnity 
payments based off of certifiable occurrences such as rainfall or other weather events (Roberts, 
2005). 
Multiple-Peril Crop Insurance 
Multiple-peril crop insurance (MPCI) has been available in the United States since the 1930s 
(USDA, 2011). This insurance type provides coverage against a variety of natural occurrences 
such as hail or fire damage (Barnett & Coble, 1999). Policy holders will pay for additional 
coverage for different perils. Although available since the 1930s, MPCI was operated on a 
limited basis until public / private partnerships in the 1980s provided subsidies to the MPCI 
packages (USDA, 2011). MPCI became more popular after regular disaster payments were 
ended in 1981 (USDA, 2011) The introduction of fully subsidized CAT coverage in 1994 
increased MPCI coverage to over 200 million acres in the United States (USDA, 2011).  
MPCI products guarantee a level of expected yield rather than measure the damage caused by 
a loss event and typically insured yields are in the range of 50 to 70 percent of historical average 
yields (Roberts, 2005). MPCI is advantageous in that it provides coverage for more perils than a 
typical index-based insurance product (IFAD, 2011b). In addition, MPCI is also well-suited for 
perils in which crop loss is difficult to measure (Roberts, 2005). An example of this in cocoa 
production would be an instance of black pod fungus, Phytophthora megakarya. The prevalence 
of the fungus is not known on a farm. A black pod infection could be affecting as few as one tree 
or as many as all of the trees on the farm. MPCI is also well-suited for perils that have an impact 
over time (Roberts, 2005). An example of this in cocoa would be CSSV which kills the tree and 
requires indemnity payments for losses in the initial year as well as payments for future years 
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until the replacement tree can bear fruit. MPCI is however expensive to operate and not suitable 
for smallholder agriculture in low-income countries (IFAD, 2011b). Much of the expense in 
MPCI comes from high transaction costs. Usually, it is necessary to complete pre-inspections on 
each insured farm as well as in-field measurements to assess yield loss (Stutley, 2010). Further 
exasperating the problem is that transaction costs increase in low-income countries where 
information is highly imperfect (Todaro & Smith, 2012). Premium are typically high in MPCI 
because of high losses (with high moral hazard) and administrative costs that are often exceeding 
10 to 15 percent of premiums (Stutley, 2010). Most MPCI programs operate at a loss and are 
dependent upon government subsidy (Roberts, 2005; Stutley, 2010).  
Weather-Based Index Crop Insurance 
Index-based insurance is used to avoid the high transaction costs associated with indemnity-
based systems such as MPCI (Linnerooth-Bayer et al., 2011). Index-based insurance programs 
use a proxy variable for a region rather than indemnifying losses at an individual level (Stutley, 
2010). In crop insurance, these proxies are typically weather variables such as rainfall (IFAD, 
2011b; Roberts, 2005; Stutley, 2010). Weather-based index insurance (WII) reduce transaction 
costs by eliminating on-farm assessments (Stutley, 2010). Insurance adjusters do not physically 
view losses on the farm and therefore the costs associated with sending an adjuster to each farm 
is removed. WII also reduces costs because there is a lack of adverse selection (insured have 
hidden information about their risk exposure) and a lack of moral hazard (IFAD, 2011b). Both 
are eliminated because WII-indemnities are paid only when the proxy variable – such as rainfall 
– falls below a trigger point (Roberts, 2005). Because producers have no control over weather, 
they do not have control over indemnity payments. Another advantage of WII in agriculture is 
that  it works well with correlated risks such as drought (IFAD, 2011b). This is counter intuitive 
as an ideal condition for insuring risk is that it should not have a positive correlation because it 
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can result in a catastrophic loss to the insurer (Rejda, 1995). WII is not well-suited for 
idiosyncratic risks such as hail damage but works well with systemic risks such as drought 
because the impact is over a wide area (Roberts, 2005). 
WII is not without disadvantages. WII experiences basis risk, meaning that there are times 
that a producer may experience a loss that they are not compensated for (IFAD, 2011b). This is a 
spatial basis risk and is the result of a variation in the peril occurrence within a region; WII 
works best in a homogenous region (IFAD, 2011b). In addition, WII can only cover limited 
(typically one to two) perils which may not satisfy risk-management needs of the producers 
(IFAD, 2011b). Lastly, WII is still a relatively new product and requires development in the 
technical capacity and expertise in agro-meteorology (IFAD, 2011b). 
To date there have been several applications of WII piloted (IFAD, 2011b). Variations of 
WII have been available in India since the late 1970s, the United States and Canada since the 
early 1990s, and more recently available in Morocco, Mexico, Sudan, and Brazil (Stutley, 2010). 
India is the only country to undergo a market-based scale-up of WII (IFAD, 2011b). The largest 
WII program is in India where in the 2010-2011 agricultural year more than nine million farmers 
held policies, premium volume were over $ 258 million USD, and the total sum insured was over 
$3.17 billion USD (Clarke, Mahul, Rao, & Verma, 2012). In the same season, $125 million USD 
– approximately 48 percent – was paid in indemnities through the program (Clarke et al., 2012). 
The program has been successful in India where it is highly subsidized by the government and 
farmers’ premium rate is capped at 1.5 percent of insured value for wheat and two percent for 
other crops (Clarke et al., 2012). 
Crop Insurance in Low-Income Countries 
Ghana is considered a middle-income country (MIC) based on the World Bank’s 
development indicators (World Bank, 2013). MICs represent just less than half of the world’s 
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population and account for one-third of the population living on less than $ 2 USD per day 
(World Bank, 2011). The income range of MICs varies as the highest income MIC has per capita 
income ten times larger than the lowest MIC (World Bank, 2011). Although Ghana is considered 
a MIC it still faces many of the same challenges in agriculture as a low-income country (LIC). 
Specifically, agriculture is still predominantly at the subsistence level with some cash crops 
(Stutley, 2010). This broad stage of agriculture is still prevalent throughout Africa and is 
typically defined by low productivity (Todaro & Smith, 2012). A reason for this low productivity 
is that smallholder farmers are less likely to adopt new technologies (Todaro & Smith, 2012). 
Part of this unwillingness to adopt new technologies is that yield losses related to weather shocks 
can trap smallholder households in poverty (IFAD, 2011b). Crop insurance could help guard 
smallholder households from shocks. 
The availability of formal crop insurance programs is limited in low-income countries despite 
the same areas being highly susceptible to fluctuations in weather (Mobarak & Rosenzweig, 
2013). Most households low-income countries have historically mitigated risk through informal 
risk-sharing schemes, examples from India include diversified lands, migration, and marrying a 
spouse from another village that faces different risks (Rosenzweig & Stark, 1987; Townsend, 
1994). The previously-mentioned informal mechanism likely exist partially because traditional 
insurance (MPCI) is costly to operate as it requires on-farm assessment (IFAD, 2011b). Formal 
insurance programs are also less feasible in LICs where there are a large number of farmers and 
insurance markets are underdeveloped (IFAD, 2011b). These high-cost formal insurance 
programs are highly subsidized by governments to be economically feasible to producers 
(Barnett & Coble, 1999; Clarke et al., 2012; USDA, 2011). In order for crop insurance to 
become economically viable in LICs the costs of operating the programs must be kept low.  
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The interest in cost reduction has led to increased focus on WII program in LICs. WII 
programs are much cheaper to operate than MPCI programs (Linnerooth-Bayer et al., 2011). 
Reasons for this are that WII requires limited individual underwriting, it does not require on-
farm loss adjustment, it does not have problems of adverse selection, it does not have problems 
of moral hazard, and claims can be settled with lower costs than MPCI (IFAD, 2011b). The 
success of the MPCI program in the United States comes as a result of high subsidies (Barnett & 
Coble, 1999; USDA, 2011). However, subsidies are a concern for crop insurance programs in 
LICs because the inefficiencies of the subsidies lead to market distortion as farmers may take 
unnecessary risks and also because governments cannot afford to facilitate the programs; 
especially if a large section of the population is engaged in agriculture (Linnerooth-Bayer et al., 
2011). An example of market distortion from the United States occurs from producers not having 
the incentive to produce more robust crops and producers farming in areas that are high risk for 
drought or floods (Linnerooth-Bayer et al., 2011). Crop insurance in developing countries cannot 
depend upon subsidies and thus must reduce costs by reducing moral hazard, adverse selection, 
and administrative costs in order to be economically viable; all of which are incentives of WII.  
Crop Insurance in Ghana 
In December of 2009, a project called Innovative Insurance Products for the Adaptation to 
Climate Change (IIPACC) was initiated with funding from the German Federal Ministry for the 
Environment, Nature Conservation, and Nuclear Safety (Stutley, 2010). This project was jointly 
implemented by the National Insurance Commission of Ghana (NIC) and Gesellschaft für 
Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) (Stutley, 2010). The stated objective of IIPACC is, “to 
support the development of a sustainable agricultural insurance system and to introduce 
innovative and demand-oriented crop insurance products to protect against financial risks caused 
by extreme weather events and other forms of climate change” (Gille, 2013).  
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The Ghana Agricultural Insurance Programme (GAIP) is funded through the IIPACC (GAIP, 
2013). The steering committee of GAIP was established in September of 2010 (GAIP, 2013). 
This committee was comprised of eleven GAIP-member institutions:  (1) National Insurance 
Commission (chair), (2) Ministry of Finance & Economic Planning, (3) Ministry of Food & 
Agriculture, (4) Ghana Meteorological Agency, (5) Ghana Insurers Association,  (6) Ghana Re, 
(7) Ghanaian farmer representatives, (8) Stanbic Bank, (9) Agricultural Development Bank, (10) 
Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) (secretariat), and (11) the World Bank 
(GAIP, 2013). The first insurance product that became available from GAIP was a WII product 
released in 2011 that covered over 3,000 smallholder farmers (GAIP, 2013). The coverage was 
available in three different regions and only covered maize (Gille, 2013). In 2011, the WII was 
extended to three additional regions, six in total, and also began to cover soya in addition to 
maize (Gille, 2013). By 2012, MPCI and a pilot for Area-yield index insurance  (AYII), which is 
much like WII but relies on observed yields over an area rather than a weather index, were added 
to the available insurance products from GAIP as well as one additional region and coverage 
now extended to include maize, soya, and sorghum (Gille, 2013). Since the start of GAIP in 
December of 2009, the program has had success in creating dialogue between the public and 
private sector, capacity building the supply side of available insurance products, creating a 
regulatory framework, diversifying risk through reinsurance policies, and creating awareness of 
the program (Gille, 2013). However, GAIP has struggled to create cost-effective distribution 
channels, provide affordable premiums (or adequate risk coverage), minimize basis risk, or 
actively engage the government (Gille, 2013). Government involvement is lacking in part 
because crop insurance is largely viewed as a commercial initiative rather than a public initiative. 
Crop insurance should be viewed as an instrument to manage agricultural and climate risks by 
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the government to ensure successful scale-up and use of insurance in Ghana. This involvement 
can contribute to the affordability and comprehensive coverage of crop insurance in Ghana, more 
producers being covered by insurance, and the sustainability of a crop insurance program in 
Ghana (Gille, 2013). Although crop insurance has become more available in recent years in 
Ghana, there is currently still no crop insurance product available for cocoa. 
Crop Insurance for Cocoa 
Cocoa crop insurance was offered for two to three years in Jamaica in the early 1980s (Mahul 
& Stutley, 2008). The product offered was an MPCI product that was discontinued because of 
underwriting costs and an inability to properly define losses due to drought (Mahul & Stutley, 
2008). The inabilities to properly define losses from drought were likely due to insufficient 
historical data. In Ghana, agricultural statistics are managed by the Ghana statistics, research, 
and information department (SRID). However, SRID has not maintained any time-series 
production and yield databases for plantation tree crops, including cocoa (Stutley, 2010). In 
Ghana, the Ghana Cocoa Board and its affiliate, Cocoa Research Institute of Ghana (CRIG), are 
responsible for all aspects of research and development for the sector. However, collecting and 
maintaining reliable yield data has not been a priority, and to date, the Cocoa Board does not 
have accurate data on the number of cocoa farmers in the country or the total area under 
production, much less farm by farm yield data (personal communication Mr. E.T. Quartey, 
Director of Research, Monitoring and Evaluation, Cocobod).The absence of these data are not 
ideal in conducting formal risk assessment for those crops (Stutley, 2010). Data are a 
fundamental need for proper risk assessment. Another risk-assessment challenge facing cocoa is 
the production cycle of perennial crops. Vilsack (2009) describes this production cycle in four 
stages: (1) establishment: zero yield, (2) development: exponential yield growth, (3) 
maintenance: relatively constant yields, and (4) decline: reduction in yields. Mahrizal et al. 
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(2014), using data from Afari-Sefa et al. (2009), show that the yield of a cocoa tree depends 
heavily on the age of the tree (figure 6). The inverted-U pattern seen in figure 6 was found for 
four different production scenarios: (1) low input landrace cocoa (LILC), (2) high input no shade 
amazon cocoa (HINSC), (3) high input medium shade cocoa (HIMSC), and (4) organic systems 
(Mahrizal et al., 2014). The difficulty that this presents for crop insurance is that a tree can have 
the same yield at two different points in its lifecycle but at the first point the yield is increasing 
while at the second point yield is decreasing. For example, HINSC is shown in figure 6 as the top 
curve. Yield for HINSC is approximately 800 kg ha
-1
 around year seven and again around year 
20. However, HINSC reaches maximum yield around year 14 and then yields begin to decline. If 
the underwriter for an insurance program did not know the age of the tree they would not be able 
to assess if expected yields the following year would be more or less than present year. Because 
this study does not have any information about the age of the trees, an optimal tree replacement 
rate is assumed so farm production will be in steady state. The issue of tree age is of greater 
importance for a MPCI policy than a WII policy because MPCI is farm specific and WII covers a 





Figure 6. Estimated yield and age of tree for LILC, HINSC, HIMSC, and organic 
cocoa in Ghana  (Mahrizal et al., 2014) 
 
In the United States, perennial crop insurance is available through the United States 
Department of Agriculture’s Risk Management Agency. Crops covered under MPCI include: 
almonds, apples, apricots, avocados, citrus, bananas, blueberries, cranberries, coffee, figs, 
grapes, macadamia nuts, nectarines, papaya , peaches , pears, plums, prunes, table grapes, and 
walnuts (Vilsack, 2009) . Policyholders can select coverage levels between 50 and 75 percent for 
most crops based on APH (Vilsack, 2009). In 2009, the United States provided $5.4 billion USD 
in insurance premium subsidies, nearly $500 million USD went towards specialty crops in the 
fruit, vegetable, tree nuts, and nursery category (Shields, 2013). The high costs of MPCI policies 
and lack of historical data to establish APH make this policy ill-suited for cocoa in Ghana 
(Stutley, 2010). WII is more practical for a non-irrigated perennial crop (World Bank, 2009).  
  Recently, studies were commissioned to investigate the feasibility of crop insurance for 























Waterhouse Cooper (PWC) (2014) and another commissioned by the IIPACC group and 
administered by Charles Stutley (2010) –  both studies emphasized protection against disease and 
pests rather than weather events. According to Stutley (2010), drought was not reported by 
producers as a serious concern currently on their established cocoa plantations at the time of the 
study. Rather, producer more frequently cited on-farm problems with pest and disease. However, 
this study was not concerned with future scenarios when climate change is likely to cause more 
sporadic weather. The same study also found that farmers were interested in insuring against 
climatic risks, but the emphasis from cocoa producers was still on insurance for pest and disease. 
Five potential insurance products were created from this study, one of which was for cocoa. 
Stutley (2010) proposed a CAT coverage policy to protect cocoa producers against CSSV 
infection. The catastrophic coverage would be provided by the government and would pay out in 
the event of tree loss due to CSSV (Stutley, 2010). 
A third study, commissioned by Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) and 
administered by Jan Jozwik (2013), looked specifically at agricultural index insurance for cocoa. 
The study cautions against using historical weather data in a time of more variable weather. Over 
50 percent of the surveyed producers in the GIZ study reported a perceived general decline in 
rainfall, 33 percent cited an increase in rainfall and 16 percent stated that rainfall had become 
more erratic (Jozwik, 2013). Although the results are based upon qualitative data of the farmers’ 
perceptions of rainfall, they could indicate that weather was quite variable in a small region or 
possibly that producers’ perceptions were quite variable in a small region. All 114 producers 
surveyed for this study were from the Ashanti region; spatial basis risk is a potential issue for 
index insurance in Ghana (Jozwik, 2013). Jozwik (2013) suggests training farmers on collecting 
weather data to reduce basis risk. The Jozwik study also found farmers to be particularly 
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interested in insurance against black pod and CSSV. It is important to note that in the case of 
CSC producers’, access to crop insurance is coupled with training programs that teach producers 
how to mitigate risks of disease such as black pod and CSSV. Therefore limiting risk exposure to 
these disease through proper management practices. For this reason, WII seems to be a more 
appropriate insurance product for CSC because it trains producers on best management practices 
and guards them from losses in the event that the producer does everything right but poor 
weather conditions reduce cocoa yields. There is a large potential benefit of providing index 
insurance but care must be taken in order to provide insurance that benefits the producers 
(Clarke, 2011). 
 
G. Risk  
The World Bank (2014) states that taking on risk is needed to pursue opportunities for 
development and warns that the risk of inaction may be the worst option of all in achieving their 
development goals for the poor. The poor tend to be the most vulnerable to risks because adverse 
shocks such as crop failure are a major cause of moving households deeper into poverty from 
which they cannot easily escape (IFAD, 2011a; Todaro & Smith, 2012; World Bank, 2014). 
Adverse shocks (i.e. crop failure) can prevent smallholder farmers from realizing opportunities 
(i.e. higher yields) (Cole et al., 2013; Dercon & Christiaensen, 2011; Dercon et al., 2011; IFAD, 
2011a; Karlan et al., 2012; Morduch, 1995). For example, farmers in Ethiopia choose not to use 
inorganic fertilizer out of fear of droughts and other shocks and prefer to keep their savings to 
cushion potential shocks (Dercon & Christiaensen, 2011) Conversely, farmers in Ghana and 
India have been more willing to take on risks by increasing their investments in new seeds, 
inorganic fertilizer, and other agro-chemicals because they insulated from shocks through rainfall 
insurance (WII) (Cole et al., 2013; Karlan et al., 2012). 
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The 2014 WDR cites four components of risk management: (1) knowledge: to understand 
shocks, internal and external conditions, and potential outcomes; (2) protection: reduce the 
probability and size of losses and increase benefits; (3) insurance: transfer resources across 
people and time from good to bad states of nature; and (4) coping: to recover from losses and 
make the best of benefits (World Bank, 2014). The first three components are preparations for 
risk that should compare the cost of preparation (insurance premium) and probable benefit 
(indemnity payment) (Ehrlich & Becker, 1972). Todaro and Smith (2012) cite a sequenced 
response in coping strategies used by households: (1) diversification of income sources, (2) help 
from community (social capital), (3) reduction of household size through migration, (4) sale of 
movable assets such as cattle and farm implements, and (5) sale or abandonment of fixed assets 
such as land, house, or grain stores. These coping strategies are more difficult for poor 
smallholders because they have fewer assets to cushion shocks (Todaro & Smith, 2012). As 
such, preparations for risk become more important for poor smallholders. CSC proposes to 
reduce risk by training producers on best management practices, providing access to inputs and 
credit, and providing access to insurance for producers who follow the practices of CSC. The 
incidence of yield loss to has the potential to decrease if producers have access to the information 
and materials necessary to control disease and pests. Furthermore, losses due to weather can be 
mitigated for CSC producers through crop insurance. These CSC practices can be an integral part 
of risk preparedness strategies for smallholder farmers.  
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III. Data and Methodology 
A. Description of Data 
Yield and Farm Characteristics 
The total sample of 1,200 households used in this study covered a total of five regions, 19 
districts, and 109 villages in Ghana. This study used total yearly yields, inclusive of both cocoa 
harvests from the main and light cocoa season, measured in kg ha
-1
. In addition, household farm 
characteristic data were used in this study which included the variables: input-promoter training 
for producers who had received training on efficient agrochemical input usage, a binary variable 
for fertilizer use, gender, a binary variable for shade management (appendix 5), and farm size in 
hectares. The surveys used in this study are:  (1) the baseline survey, conducted by Mathematica, 
completed in February 2011; (2) survey one, conducted by Deutsche Gesellschaft für 
Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), International Institute of Tropical Agriculture (IITA), 
TechnoServe, and Socodevi, completed in August 2011; (3) survey two, conducted by the same 
CLP partners as survey one, completed in February 2012; and (4) survey three, conducted by 
Dalberg Global Development Advisors, completed in August 2012. These surveys were 
conducted across Cameroon, Nigeria, Côte d’Ivoire, and Ghana. However, this study restricts 
data to Ghana because that is the focus area for NCRC’s climate-smart cocoa initiative. 
Furthermore, these four surveys only cover the main cropping seasons for 2010-2011 and 2011-
2012. 
After the data were cleaned by removing observations outside of two standard deviations 
from the mean for land size and yield (appendix 3), there were a total of 1,200 households (the 
observational unit) across the four surveys. The distributions of sample sizes across region and 
district are presented in table 1. 
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Table 1. Distribution of survey observations by region and district 
Location n 
Ashanti 194 
Adansi South 44 
Ahafo Ano South 36 
Atwima Nwabiagya 61 
Bosome Freho 53 
Brong-Ahafo 124 
Asunafo North 40 
Asunafo South 42 
Asutifi 42 
Central 115 
Asin North 60 
Upper Denkyira West 55 
Eastern 267 
Akyemansa 54 
Birim North 45 
Birim South 168 
Western 500 
Aowin Suaman 55 
Bia 52 
Bibiani Awiaso Bekwia 49 
Juaboso 138 
Sefwi Akontombra 44 
Sefwi Wiawso 112 
Wassa Amenfi West 50 
All Regions 1,200 
Note: Regions are in bold font with districts contained within 
region following and indented 
  
Weather 
Daily weather observations for 2008-2013 were obtained from Awhere Incorporated’s online 
weather platform (accessed March 31, 2014). Awhere provides daily weather observations on 
weather variables including, but not limited to: precipitation (mm), minimum and maximum 
temperatures (
o
C), and growing degree days with a flexible threshold that can be adjusted online. 
This study only uses daily precipitation data. These data were available at a five arc-minute 
resolution, or about nine kilometer square grid cells. The weather data were collected by a 
combination of global meteorological on-the-ground stations and orbiting weather satellites. 
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These data were the approximate equivalent of having a ground station every nine kilometers. 
The advantage of using data at this resolution for this study was that individual villages had 
unique weather data unless multiple villages were contained within the same 9
2
 km grid cell.  
This study used daily weather observations from January 1, 2008 to December 31, 2013. The 
primary focus of the weather data was on observations during the pod maturation stage; June 1 
through October 31. Although there were a total of four surveys conducted, yield data were only 
available for two main cropping seasons, 2010-2011 and 2011-12, in which all appropriate 
weather data were matched with yield data by village location of the cocoa farms. Additional 
years of precipitation data were used to simulate precipitation data.  Because these data only 
covered five years, robust precipitation distributions could not be obtained. To create 
precipitation distributions, all daily precipitation observations from the pod maturation stage 
were pooled for the five years of available data. Then, days from the pool were randomly 
selected with replacement 153 times (duration of pod maturation stage). This process was 




Traditionally a crop insurance program is written based upon historical yield data of the farm 
or region, also called actual production history (APH). Because data on yield and production are 
scarce for cocoa in Ghana, APH is not available so a distribution of possible yields must be 
estimated so that the likelihoods of various thresholds can be estimated. These estimations can 
then be used to compute a fair market value for crop insurance. A previous yield model was 




𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑌𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐹𝐵𝑆𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑃𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽5𝐹𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽6𝐹𝐵𝑂𝑖 + 𝛽7𝐹𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖 +
𝛽8𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑔𝑖 + 𝛽9𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽10𝐻𝑒𝑟𝑏𝑖 + 𝛽11𝑙𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖 + 𝝋𝟏𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑆𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑖 + 𝝋𝟐𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖  (1) 
 
Where logYi is the natural log of cocoa yield (kg ha
-1
) for the i
th
 farmer, FFSi, FBSi, and IPi are 
binary variables indicating the completion of the CLP farmer field school (FFS), farmer business 
school (FBS) and input promoter (IP), respectively for the i
th
 farmer, Genderi is a binary variable 
with a value of one indicating the i
th
 farmer is male, FarmSizei is the natural log of cocoa farm 
size measured in hectares for the i
th
 farmer, Ferti, Fungi, Insecti, Herbi, ImprVari, and FBOi are 
binary variables having a value of one if the participant used inorganic fertilizer, fungicide, 
insecticide, herbicide, improved cocoa varieties, or was a member of an farmer-based 
organization, respectively for the i
th
 farmer, SeedSourcei is a vector for source of seed (seeds 
from own farm, friend’s farm, or government-certified seed which was included in the constant 
term) for the i
th
 farmer, Locationi is a vector for location (Atwima Nwabiagya, Juaboso, and 
Sefwi Wiawso, with Birim South included in the constant term) for the i
th
 farmer, and εi is the 
error term for the i
th
 farmer. 
While Norton’s model was also specified to estimate yield, the purpose of the specification 
was different than this study. Norton investigated benefits of farmer training schools in Ghana. 
This study is also interested in the effect that training has on yield but furthermore, this study is 
interested in the impact of precipitation on yield.  This study is restricted in what variables can be 
used because the regression will later be used to simulate yields. Therefore, variables that can be 
simulated are preferred and other variables included that cannot be simulated should have good 
justification for remaining in the model. Several alternative models were tested for this study, 
four of which are presented in table 2. 
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Table 2. Alternative regressions for yield model 





















Ahafo Ano South 2.96 35.88   34.02 33.74 
Akyemansa 14.84 178.39
***














Asin North 5.21 106.32
***





















































Birim North 54.82 158.61
***














Bosome Freho 4.67 83.74
**


















































     


















































Non-response shade   13.07   
survey 1 94.77
**
         
survey 2 -123.15
***
         
survey 3 27.43         
R-Square 0.25 0.24 0.33 0.24 0.24 
Adj R-Square 0.23 0.23 0.31 0.23 0.23 
Root MSE 200.96 201.41 220.13 201.48 201.41 
n 1,200 1,200 338 1,200 1,200 
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The first model investigated did not include a variable for precipitation; rather, the changes in 
precipitation were captured by the survey effect (survey 1, survey 2, survey 3, and the baseline in 
the constant term). Model one also investigated total inorganic fertilizer use (fertilizer) rather 
than dividing fertilizer use into fertilizer use with training (TF) and fertilizer use without training 
(NTF). The results of model one indicate that shade management (shade) is potentially a survey 
effect because shade is not significant when the fixed-effect for survey is included in the 
regression. Meaning, the positive outcome associated with shade that was observed in all other 
models could be explained by differences in the sampling instrument between surveys. This 
model was rejected primarily because survey effect cannot be easily simulated. Rather, by 
excluding it, the model captures the average effect of the survey. Otherwise, the survey 
instrument used would need to be assumed.  
Several changes were made from model one to model two. The survey effect was replaced 
with a variable for the natural log of precipitation (lnprecip) during the pod maturation period. 
The variable lnprecip is highly significant when introduced in the model and remains highly 
significant in all subsequent models. The variable shade became significant when the survey 
effect was removed from the model. Model two was primarily rejected because this study was 
interested in investigating the impact of training on fertilizer use by removing the variable 
fertilizer and replacing it with fertilizer use with training (TF) and fertilizer use without training 
(NTF). Model two only captures the total effect of using fertilizer with no distinction to whether 
or not the producer had used fertilizer.  
Model three was investigated over concerns of non-responses for the variable shade. Model 
three excludes the baseline survey because respondents were not asked if they practiced shade 
management on the baseline survey. When the baseline was excluded, shade not only remained 
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positive and significant, the coefficient increased from 42.5 kg ha
-1
 to 60.89 kg ha
-1
.  Excluding 
the baseline survey reduced the sample size from 1,200 to 338. Model three was rejected 
primarily because of large the large loss of temporal observations (1,200 to 338) including a 
reduction in districts from 19 to four. Spatial observations are critical to observe variation in the 
variable lnprecip across space. 
Model four was also investigated over concern of non-responses for the shade variable. In 
model four, all samples were included and an additional variable was included for a non-
response for shade management (Non-response shade). This variable was not significant and did 
cause any large changes in any of the other coefficients that were used in the final model. Model 
four was rejected because the non-response variable for shade management (Non-response 
shade) was not significant and therefore did not add any explanatory power to the model.  
Furthermore, the non-responses for shade management do not appear to be a problem in this 
model because not only is Non-response shade not significant in model four, shade remains 
positive and significant in model three when the baseline is excluded. 
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IV. Results and Discussion 
Summary Statistics 
The majority (59.33%) of producers surveyed in this study were male, only 17.5 percent of 
all producers surveyed had undergone input promoter (IP) training through the CLP, 52.33 
percent of all producers used inorganic fertilizer, and 20.25 percent practiced shade management. 
In total, 12.9% of the surveyed producer bad both undergone input training and were practicing 
shade management. The percentage of respondents who had undergone IP training was low 
because the majority (71%) of the sample was collected during the baseline survey at which time 
no producer had completed IP training. Similarly, the survey conducted during the baseline did 
not ask respondents if they practiced shade management. Alternate regressions (table 2) were 
investigated over concerns in the missing data for shade management. The final regression form 
(equation 2) was deemed robust because shade remained positive and significant when the 
baseline data was excluded from the regression (i.e. non-responses were excluded) and shade 
remained positive and significant when a non-response variable was included in the regression. 
The average farm size for the sample was 3.06 hectares, average daily precipitation during the 
pod maturation period was 3.35 mm, and average yield for the sample was 325.71 kg ha
-1
. The 
district with the highest average yield was Sefwi Wiawso in the Western Region with 416.63 kg 
ha
-1
































60.31% 12.89% 2.88  27.84% 20.62% 3.07  232.64  




Adansi South 68.18% 0.00% 2.96  29.55% 0.00% 3.28  304.39  




Ahafo Ano South 61.11% 0.00% 3.23  30.56% 0.00% 3.56  217.74  




Atwima Nwabiagya 55.74% 40.98% 2.35  37.70% 65.57% 2.56  217.41  












46.77% 0.00% 3.67  27.42% 0.00% 3.56  263.18  




Asunafo North 42.50% 0.00% 3.30  32.50% 0.00% 3.75  290.38  




Asunafo South 52.38% 0.00% 3.88  28.57% 0.00% 3.53  265.58  




Asutifi 45.24% 0.00% 3.81  21.43% 0.00% 3.42  234.87  






57.39% 0.00% 2.84  52.17% 0.00% 3.16  290.36  




Asin North 61.67% 0.00% 2.26  53.33% 0.00% 2.99  268.56  




Upper Denkyira W. 52.73% 0.00% 3.48  50.91% 0.00% 3.35  314.14  






58.43% 32.58% 2.82  53.56% 30.34% 2.69  339.37  









Akyemansa 59.26% 0.00% 3.17  33.33% 0.00% 2.51  233.83  




Birim North 57.78% 0.00% 3.55  31.11% 0.00% 2.94  261.26  




Birim South 58.33% 51.79% 2.52  66.07% 48.21% 2.68  394.22  






63.00% 19.60% 3.16  67.40% 24.40% 3.80  378.17  




Aowin Suaman 74.55% 0.00% 3.78  74.55% 0.00% 4.50  403.42  




Bia 61.54% 0.00% 4.08  67.31% 0.00% 3.89  389.96  




Bib. Awiaso Bekwia 44.90% 0.00% 2.38  44.90% 0.00% 3.24  351.97  




Juaboso 60.14% 39.86% 3.08  70.29% 55.80% 4.03  376.72  




Sefwi Akontombra 70.45% 0.00% 3.05  65.91% 0.00% 3.97  404.42  




Sefwi Wiawso 67.86% 38.39% 2.76  69.64% 40.18% 3.25  416.63  




Wassa Amenfi West 60.00% 0.00% 3.45  70.00% 0.00% 3.90  258.58  










Note: All values in parentheses are standard errors. ‘
A
’: denotes a region while all others are districts ‘
B
’: No farmers had received 
training prior to the baseline survey ‘
C









After alternative specifications for the estimated regression model of this study were 
investigated (table 2), a final estimated regression model was determined. The estimated 
regression model for this study is estimated as: 
 
𝑌𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑫𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒊 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑃𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑇𝐹𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑁𝑇𝐹𝑖 + 𝛽5𝐺𝑛𝑑𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽6𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 +
𝛽8𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖                  (2) 
 
Where Yi is observed annual yield (kg ha
-1
) for the i
th
 farmer, Disti is a vector of binary variables 
representing individual districts (locations) for the i
th
 farmer with the district Wassa Amenfi 
West included in the intercept, IPi is a binary variable taking a value of one for farmers who have 
completed IP training for the i
th
 farmer, TFi  is a binary variable taking a value of one for farmers 
who has received both IP training  and also used inorganic fertilizer for the i
th
 farmer,  NTFi is a 
binary variable taking a value of one for a farmer who has not received training but had used 
inorganic fertilizer for the i
th
 farmer, Gndri is a binary variable taking a value of one when the 
household head is male) for the i
th
 farmer, Shadei is a binary variable taking a value of one if the 
farm uses shade management for the i
th
 farmer, lnSizei is the natural logarithm of farm size in 
hectares for the i
th
 farmer, and lnPrecipi is the natural logarithm of average precipitation mm per 
day for the i
th







⁄        (3) 
 
Where Precipλti is average daily precipitation in mm for the i
th
 farmer in the λ
th
 location in the t
th
 
time period, Pdi is daily precipitation in millimeters for the i
th
 farmer and 153 is the duration in 
days of the pod maturation period for the main crop; from June 1 to October 31. Jozwik (2013) 
51 
 
reports that 73 percent of farmers surveyed cited precipitation during this period as a major 
driver of yield. Any farms within a five arc-minute resolution have identical precipitation 
observations because this is the level at which weather data are aggregated. A complete list of 
independent variables with definitions and responses is shown in table 4. 
 
Table 4. Definition of regression variables 
Variable  Definition Response 
Disti District where respondents farm is located district name 
IPi Respondent completed IP training 1=yes, 0=no 
TFi Respondent completed IP training and used inorganic fertilizer 1=yes, 0=no 
NTFi 
Respondent did not complete IP training but used inorganic 
fertilizer 1=yes, 0=no 
Gndri Gender of household head 
1=male, 
0=female 
Shadei Respondent practiced shade management (appendix 5) 1=yes, 0=no 
lnSizei Natural logarithm of respondents reported farm size hectares 
lnPrecip




Several variables that were not significant in the Norton et al. (2014) model (Equation 1) 
were also tested in this study but were excluded in the present model (Equation 2) because they 
were again found to not be significant. These variables are: (1) FFS, (2) FBS, (3) FBO, (4) 
fungicide, (5) herbicide, and (6) seed source. Insecticide use was found to be significant in 
Norton et al. (2014) but was excluded from this study because it was not found to be statistically 
significant. The two models also differ in how fertilizer use was analyzed. Norton et al. (2014) 
only indicates if fertilizer was used not if a producer was trained on how to use it. This study 
breaks inorganic fertilizer use in to two categories to determine the impact of training on the 
effectiveness of fertilizer use. As such, fertilizer use was classified into two categorical variables. 





IP) for a producer who uses fertilizer and has undergone input-use 
training. Also, Norton et al. (2014) used the natural logarithm of yield as the dependent variable. 
This study found a linear relationship to be a better fit to the data. This is plausible because 
yields are sufficiently low in Ghana (<400 kg ha
-1
) that they have not yet reached the point of 
diminishing marginal returns that would be realized when yields are. The most notable difference 
between the two models is the inclusion of mean daily precipitation (mm) during the cocoa pod 
maturation period in this model. Precipitation during this period was included in this model 
because it is a determining agro-meteorological factor in cocoa production. Previous studies find 
precipitation to have varying effects – both positive and negative – depending on the amount of 
precipitation (Ajayi, Afolabi, Ogunbodede, & Sunday, 2010; Ojo & Sadiq, 2010; Oyekale, 
2012). Yield reductions occur because pods cannot mature with too little rain and too much rain 
increases the prevalence of disease such as black pod (Wood & Lass, 1985). Although the 
natural log was determined to be the most appropriate fit for this study, intuition dictates that too 
much precipitation would cause reductions in yield, requiring a quadratic function. However, 
there are not enough observations in this study to observe this relationship and therefore the 
natural log was used. Lastly, a binary variable for shade was added in the present model because 
of the importance of shade in CSC practices as well as cocoa production in general.  
Regression results are reported in table 5. Wassa Amenfi West was defined as the constant 
and all other locations were compared to this district. All location coefficients were found to be 
positive compared to Wassa Amenfi West and all but Ahafo Ano South and Juaboso were found 
to be statistically different. Although IP training alone was not found to be statistically 
significant, the interaction between fertilizer use and IP training (TF) was found to be significant. 
This indicates that many of the advantages of the IP training program come from the 
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understanding of how to properly use fertilizer. Fertilizer use without training (NTF) was also 
found to be significant; however, the coefficient for TF was higher at 156.48 kg ha
-1
 as compared 
to 118.07 kg ha
-1
 for NTF. TF was expected to have a higher coefficient than NTF because IP 
training teaches producers about efficient and effective input usage. Slightly larger yields were 
also realized when the household head was male rather than female, with a coefficient of 35.47 
kg ha
-1
. As farm size increases, the effect on yield was negative. However, this effect was 
diminishing so the natural log of farm size in hectares was used. Meaning, as a farm increases in 
size, yields decrease as a lower rate. The average hectare on a small farm often receives more 
attention from the producers than larger farms, resulting in higher yields for small farms. 
Precipitation was also found to have diminishing return on yield so the natural log of this 
variable was specified. As expected, the log of precipitation during the pod maturation period 
had a large coefficient of 367.94 kg ha
-1
 and was highly significant but with as a natural log, 
returns from precipitation are eventually diminishing. Meaning, the first millimeter of 
precipitation received on the farm is more important for cocoa yields than the 100
th
 millimeter of 
precipitation. As an example from this study, the district with the lowest average daily 
precipitation was Birim South (2.29 mm day
-1
) and the district with the highest daily 
precipitation was BIA (3.72 mm day
-1
). If Birim South, the district with the lowest average 
precipitation, were to receive an additional one centimeter (10mm) of precipitation for the entire 
season, cocoa producers there would receive an additional 10.32 kg ha
-1
 of cocoa. If BIA, the 
district with the highest average precipitation, were to receive an additional one centimeter 
(10mm) of precipitation for the entire season, cocoa producers there would only receive an 
additional 6.4 kg ha
-1
 of cocoa. As precipitation increases the benefit of each additional unit 
decreases. Lastly, shade was found to be significant with a coefficient of 42.51 kg ha
-1
.  The 
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positive coefficient result of the shade management variable is contrary to some literature 
(Ahenkorah et al., 1974; Gockowski & Sonwa, 2008, 2011; Murray, 1954). It is possible that the 
positive coefficient for shade management was the result of a survey effect in the regression as 
shade was not found to be significant in model one of table 2.  However, there are reasons that 
increased shade management would result in higher cocoa yields. Most notable are the reduction 
of pest and disease damage (Campbell, 1984) and decreased weed growth in shaded production 
systems (Ahenkorah et al., 1974). Furthermore, a forthcoming study on the effect of shade on 
cocoa yields over a four-year period in two locations of Ghana also found shade to have both a 
positive and significant effect on cocoa yields (R. Asare, Asare, Ræbild, & Anim-Kwapong, 
n.d.). The relationship between shade and cocoa yields is complex and still not completely 
understood. However, the Cocoa Research Institute of Ghana (CRIG) recommends that cocoa be 





Table 5. Regression results for yield ha
-1 





















































Upper Denkyira West 137.16
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' are significant at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.  
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The majority of variables in the regression presented in table 5 were binary variables. Only 
farm size and precipitation have associated continuous distributions. However, when simulating 
results, the average farm size, as shown in table 3, was used for each district. This was done to 
hold the effect of farm size on yield constant because farm size is not a prerequisite of CSC. 
Therefore, precipitation was the only variable with a distribution in the simulations. This 
regression has an R
2
 value of 0.24 and a root mean square error (RMSE) of 201.4. The low R
2
 
value and high RMSE indicate that much of the yield variance is not explained by this model. 
Both R
2
 and RMSE could be improved with more precise data. Some factors that can explain 
yield variation that this study does not have data for are: age of tree, tree density, soil type, soil 
fertility, percent shade cover, amount (kg) of inputs used, and date of input application. The high 
value for RMSE means that one standard deviation of yield variation is equal to 201.4 kg ha
-1
 
from the conditional mean. Because the error term was assumed to have a normal distribution 
with mean zero, 95 percent (i.e. approximately two standard deviations) of observations in the 
simulated error term can be found between -402.8 and 402.8 kg ha
-1
. Yield variations in the 












Using the previously described yield-prediction model (equation 2), Monte Carlo simulations 
were conducted based upon specific farm characteristics for two groups of cocoa producers: (1) 
those who followed CSC practices: have undergone input-use training, used inorganic fertilizer, 
and practiced shade management (appendix 5) and (2) those who did not use CSC practices: no 
input-use training, no shade management, but did use inorganic fertilizer. Each scenario was 
simulated 1,000 times to estimate mean indemnity payments for each district. Three sources of 
uncertainty (each with a distribution) exist. Potential precipitation distributions were investigated 
using the software package @RISK from the Palisade Corporation (Palisade Corporation, 2014). 
Observed data were fitted to various distributions and ranked based on Akaike Information 
Criterion. The lognormal distribution was determined to be the most appropriate distribution for 
precipitation. The distributions of the estimated betas and the error term were each assumed to be 
normally distributed consistent with conventional regression theory and the empirical evidence 
of the distribution of the residuals. Formally, the three sources of uncertainty in this model are: 
 
1. Uncertainty in precipitation, distributed such that: 
 
𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑖~𝐿𝑁(𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑝̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅, 𝜎𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑝
2 )        (4) 
 
The precipitation random draw for an individual farmer, i, has a log normal distribution with 






2. Uncertainty in the beta coefficients where b is the full vector of estimated 
coefficients, distributed such that: 
 
𝒃𝟏 − 𝒃𝒌~𝑁(𝜷𝟏 − 𝜷𝒌, 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝒃𝟏 − 𝒃𝒌))     (5) 
 
The estimated betas, b1-bk, are normally distributed with means equal to the beta coefficients, 
β1- βk, and standard deviations of the covariance of the beta estimates. In the simulations β1- βk 
representing the means are replaced by their estimates b1-bk. 
 
3. Uncertainty in the error term is distributed such that: 
 
𝜀𝑖~𝑁(0, 𝜎
2)       (6) 
 
       
The error, εi, is normally distributed with mean of zero and standard deviation of σ. 
 
All of these sources of uncertainties were included in the simulations. In all cases the 
population moments of the distributions were replaced by their sample, point estimates.  The 
simulations ran concurrently with precipitation and model uncertainties being simulated 1,000 
times each. After the uncertainties resulting from the beta coefficients and error terms were 
simulated as a function of appropriate covariances, the simulated regression coefficients were 
multiplied by the selected values of independent variables. In the case of precipitation, a Monte 
Carlo draw for precipitation was multiplied by the precipitation coefficient. All other regression 
coefficients were multiplied by fixed values of the independent variables, in most instances these 
were binary variables except for farm size which was held constant as the average from each 
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district. Negative yield observations were removed entirely before computing the yield 
distribution rather than truncated at zero because: (1) there were no instances of zero yields in the 
observed data set and (2) truncating at zero would have resulted in lower simulated yields than 
removing those observations entirely and the simulated mean yields with this adjustment are less 
than observed mean yields. On average, 12.77 percent of simulated observations were removed: 
9 percent of the CSC simulations and 17 percent of the non-CSC simulations.  
Using the above-mentioned simulation results, the fair-market premium for crop insurance – 
where premium cost is equal to average indemnity payment – was established. The results of the 
Monte Carlo simulation were used because APH – which insurance policies are typically written 
from – were not available for this study. To determine the fair market value of crop insurance the 
mean values of simulations were used in place of APH. These values differ among locations as 
well as across the characteristics of the farm. The equation for fair market crop insurance can be 
shown as: 
 




𝑛⁄ ∗ ∑ ((?̅? ∗ 𝑐) − 𝑚1−𝑗) 𝑗⁄ ∗ 𝑃𝑐𝑜𝑐𝑜𝑎   (8) 
 
Where j is the total number of simulations with yield below the defined coverage level of the 
insurance (50% and 70% in this study), n is the total number of simulations, (?̅? ∗ 𝑐) is the crop 
coverage level with ?̅? as the average of the simulated yields estimated in the model and c is the 
coverage level of insurance, m1-j are simulated values below the coverage level such that 
𝑚 < (?̅? ∗ 𝑐), and Pcocoa is the producer price set by the Ghanaian Cocoa Board. Price was 
converted to USD by taking the average of daily exchange rates from the main cocoa harvest for 
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the 2012-2013 season, resulting in a producer price of $1.77 USD kg
-1
 for this study. Two 
coverage levels were used in this study. CAT coverage of 50 percent was used a minimum with a 
buy-up options to 70 percent. This range was considered reasonable of cocoa producers because 
50 percent CAT coverage is the minimum commercially-available option and coverage levels in 
excess of 70 percent were considered too expensive to maintain. The true costs of operating an 
insurance program are understated by using Equation 8 because it does not incorporate 
administrative and operational costs which accounts for 20 percent of insurance premium for 
maize in the USA by a conservative estimate (Babcock & Cox, 2012). 
Yield simulations were conducted based upon specific farm characteristics for two groups of 
cocoa producers: (1) those who followed CSC practices: have undergone input-use training, used 
inorganic fertilizer, and practiced shade management (appendix 5) and (2) those who did not use 
CSC practices: no input-use training, no shade management, but did use inorganic fertilizer. The 
two groups, CSC and non-CSC can be shown as: 
 
𝐶𝑆?̂? = 𝐼𝑃 + 𝑇𝐹 + 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑑𝑒             (9) 
 
𝑛𝑜𝑛 − 𝐶𝑆𝐶̂ = 𝑁𝑇𝐹       (10) 
 
All else was held constant for the analysis including farm size, gender, and fertilizer use. 
Both climate-smart and non-climate-smart producers were assumed to have used inorganic 
fertilizer. Although only 52.33 percent of all respondents used fertilizer (table 3), it was held 
constant because there are instances of fertilizer use without training. Results from the regression 
parameters show a yield difference favoring CSC producers by 96.68 kg ha
-1
. This value was 
obtained by subtracting equation 10 from equation 9. However, when simulations for CSC and 
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non-CSC were conducted for each district with 1,000 iterations, the yield difference favoring 
CSC producers was reduced to 67.24 kg ha
-1
 on average. The change in yield difference between 
CSC and non-CSC producers from the regression parameters (96.68 kg ha
-1
) and the simulated 
yields (67.24 kg ha
-1
) is a result of how negative values were managed during simulations. 
Negative values were removed disproportionately for CSC (9% of samples) and non-CSC (17% 
of samples) producers in the simulation results. This dichotomy existed because non-CSC 
producers had a lower yield on average, meaning negative higher probability of simulating a 
negative value. By removing more left-side observations for non-CSC producers than CSC 
producers, the yield difference between the two groups reduces. This adds some positive bias to 
the yields of non-CSC producers. Average simulated yield results are presented in table 6. 
Climate-smart producers were found to have higher yields than non-climate-smart producers at 
the one-percent level in every district. The largest difference in average yield was found in 
Juaboso where CSC producers had an average of 77.31 kg ha
-1
 more than non-CSC producers 
and the smallest difference in average yield was found in Atwima Nwabiagya where CSC 
producers had an average of 52.26 kg ha
-1
 more than non-CSC producers. The yield differences 
viewed in the simulated results for Juaboso and Atwima Nwabiagya are likely the result of the 
standard errors of the regression. Juaboso had the largest yield difference and the smallest 
standard error from the regression results. Similarly, Atwima Nwabiagya had the smallest yield 
difference and the highest standard error in the regression results. The wider the variability in 
yield was for the two groups, the smaller the overall yield difference was between them. The 
results of yield differences indicated that by adopting CSC practices farmers would see higher 
average yields with only slight increases in the standard deviation of yield. This means that the 
gains in average yield do not come with higher yield risks.    
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Table 6. Simulated yield (kg ha
-1
) comparison between CSC and non-CSC 
  Non-CSC CSC 
Adansi South 275.17 341.84 
 
(167.99) (189.53) 
Ahafo Ano South 286.29 356.31 
 
(171.49) (187.85) 
Akyemansa 248.97 310.78 
 
(162.03) (185.13) 
Aowin Suaman 310.07 384.97 
 
(178.09) (197.49) 
Asin North 271.17 335.37 
 
(171.46) (188.78) 
Asunafo North 313.12 389.65 
 
(182.43) (193.78) 
Asunafo South 296.07 371.52 
 
(174.44) (192.17) 
Asutifi 297.51 366.88 
 
(171.69) (186.45) 
Atwima Nwabiagya 271.57 323.83 
 
(188.90) (207.85) 
Bia 310.81 385.85 
 
(182.63) (191.37) 
Bibiani  Awiaso Bekwia 298.40 367.08 
 
(177.14) (187.49) 
Birim North 243.16 304.59 
 
(165.90) (181.79) 
Birim South 227.40 282.70 
 
(158.25) (179.03) 
Bosome Freho 239.31 292.64 
 
(154.84) (177.95) 
Juaboso 312.74 390.05 
 
(184.22) (192.51) 
Sefwi Akontombra 303.05 373.66 
 
(183.05) (196.59) 
Sefwi Wiawso 300.57 369.47 
 
(177.75) (196.41) 
Upper Denkyira West 267.42 333.95 
 
(167.43) (188.23) 
Wassa Amenfi West 298.01 367.25 
  (176.14) (193.89) 
Note: All yield differences are significant at the one-percent level across rows 
All values in parentheses are standard errors  
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The simulated average yields from table 6 were then used to compute the amount of total 
yield (kg ha
-1
) that insurance would cover for producers at different coverage levels for both 
CSC and non-CSC producers. Insured yield is computed as: 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑠 = 𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑠𝑖𝑚 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒    (11) 
 
Where Yieldins is the insured yield that the farmer is guaranteed to receive in the event of a loss, 
Yieldsim is the simulated average yield values from table 6 and Coverage is the percentage of 
expected yield that is guaranteed to the producer in the event of a loss. For this study, coverage 
levels were investigated at the 50-percent and 70-percent levels. The insured yield differs across 
districts, coverage level, and production system (CSC or non-CSC). The lowest insured yield in 
this study was for a non-CSC producer in Birim South with a 50-percent coverage level. The 
insured yield in this instance was only 113.70 kg ha
-1
. Conversely, a CSC producer in Asunafo 
North with a 70-percent coverage level will have an insured yield of 272.75 kg ha
-1
. The 
differences for insured yields were a result of the differences in expected yields for non-CSC and 
CSC producers as well as the coverage level being investigated. Table 7 presents the insured 
yield (i.e. yield amount that is guaranteed by the insurance policy) for 50 and 70 percent 





Table 7. Insured yield (kg ha
-1
) amounts for CSC and non-CSC by district 
 
50 Percent 70 Percent 
  Non-CSC CSC Non-CSC CSC 
Adansi South 137.58 170.92 192.62 239.29 
Ahafo Ano South 143.15 178.15 200.41 249.41 
Akyemansa 124.48 155.39 174.28 217.55 
Aowin Suaman 155.04 192.49 217.05 269.48 
Asin North 135.59 167.69 189.82 234.76 
Asunafo North 156.56 194.82 219.18 272.75 
Asunafo South 148.04 185.76 207.25 260.06 
Asutifi 148.75 183.44 208.25 256.81 
Atwima Nwabiagya 135.78 161.91 190.10 226.68 
Bia 155.41 192.92 217.57 270.09 
Bibiani  Awiaso Bekwia 149.20 183.54 208.88 256.96 
Birim North 121.58 152.29 170.21 213.21 
Birim South 113.70 141.35 159.18 197.89 
Bosome Freho 119.66 146.32 167.52 204.85 
Juaboso 156.37 195.02 218.92 273.03 
Sefwi Akontombra 151.53 186.83 212.14 261.56 
Sefwi Wiawso 150.28 184.74 210.40 258.63 
Upper Denkyira West 133.71 166.98 187.19 233.77 
Wassa Amenfi West 149.01 183.63 208.61 257.08 
 
Any time the simulated yield amount was less than the insured amounts presented in table 7, 
an indemnity was triggered. The difference in the amount of simulated yield and insured yield 
what will henceforth be known as yield gap. An average was taken for all instances in which 
simulated yields were less than insured yield. These average yield gaps are presented in table 8 
for each district at 50 and 70 percent coverage levels. The yield gap for CSC was larger than 
non-CSC. However, it is important to remember that the average yields for CSC producers were 
significantly higher than non-CSC producers with an average yield difference of 67.24 kg ha
-1
 
(table 6) and yield variance (standard deviation) is only slightly higher for CSC producers. 
Meaning that in absolute terms, CSC cocoa is slightly riskier. However, when yield is 
normalized, CSC is less risky. The larger yield gap values for CSC were expected as their 
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average and insured yields were also higher than non-CSC with only minimal increases in 
variance.  
 
Table 8. Average yield (kg ha
-1
) gap for CSC and non-CSC by district 
 
50 Percent 70 Percent 
  Non-CSC CSC Non-CSC CSC 
Adansi South 65.47 72.12 89.60 101.54 
Ahafo Ano South 64.94 78.67 88.37 105.75 
Akyemansa 63.38 72.15 85.80 99.61 
Aowin Suaman 68.82 81.24 95.20 112.92 
Asin North 64.29 73.32 86.96 104.65 
Asunafo North 67.89 81.96 94.88 109.99 
Asunafo South 62.14 82.26 91.91 108.14 
Asutifi 68.27 75.78 88.24 101.19 
Atwima Nwabiagya 66.99 71.81 93.96 102.52 
Bia 71.23 73.13 100.36 106.56 
Bibiani Awiaso Bekwia 63.80 71.09 89.37 97.63 
Birim North 59.54 68.66 82.98 97.66 
Birim South 53.93 68.13 78.83 92.14 
Bosome Freho 54.31 64.03 75.53 88.97 
Juaboso 67.04 81.58 97.74 104.37 
Sefwi Akontombra 72.76 76.46 96.96 109.83 
Sefwi Wiawso 67.01 82.33 89.84 112.21 
Upper Denkyira West 64.62 73.79 87.53 99.87 
Wassa Amenfi West 64.55 73.67 87.28 111.55 
Yield Gap = difference of insured yield minus simulated yield (when simulated yield < insured 
yield) 
0 
The probability of receiving an indemnity payment is presented in table 9 for the 50 and 70 
percent coverage levels for each district surveyed. The probability of receiving an indemnity 
payment is defined as: 
 
% 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑦 =
𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑏𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑟 𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑
𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠




The trigger yield is the trigger amount at which a farmer will receive an indemnity payment 
(USDA, 2011). In this study, the trigger yields are the insured yields (table 7) that are computed 
by taking the average of simulated yields multiplied by the coverage rate (50% and 70%). When 
a simulated yield was less than the insured yield, an indemnity payment was made for the 
difference (kg) times the price of cocoa. In each instance, the probability of receiving an 
indemnity payment was greater for non-CSC producers despite having lower yield gaps. Again, 
this was dependent upon the difference in average and insured yields for CSC and non-CSC 
producers. Table 9 shows that there were fewer indemnity payments (i.e. less yield risk) for CSC 
than non-CSC producers in every district surveyed in this study. The reduction in risk can likely 
be attributed to the increased yields associated with following CSC practices. Namely, yield 
increases are realized primarily through training, especially in unison with inorganic fertilizer 






Table 9. Percent chance of indemnity payment at the district level 
 
50 Percent 70 Percent 
  Non-CSC CSC Non-CSC CSC 
Adansi South 23.6% 21.0% 35.3% 32.9% 
Ahafo Ano South 23.0% 18.9% 35.8% 30.8% 
Akyemansa 25.3% 23.3% 37.1% 34.8% 
Aowin Suaman 21.7% 18.5% 34.1% 29.4% 
Asin North 25.0% 21.8% 37.7% 32.5% 
Asunafo North 22.2% 17.0% 34.9% 28.6% 
Asunafo South 23.5% 17.7% 34.4% 29.7% 
Asutifi 20.3% 17.4% 34.0% 29.9% 
Atwima Nwabiagya 28.5% 25.1% 40.0% 37.3% 
Bia 22.9% 18.0% 34.1% 28.6% 
Bibiani  Awiaso Bekwia 22.4% 17.9% 35.3% 31.1% 
Birim North 25.9% 23.5% 37.0% 35.2% 
Birim South 28.8% 24.9% 39.6% 36.9% 
Bosome Freho 24.5% 23.4% 37.7% 36.4% 
Juaboso 22.9% 15.9% 34.2% 29.1% 
Sefwi Akontombra 22.9% 19.6% 35.6% 30.5% 
Sefwi Wiawso 22.2% 19.0% 35.5% 30.1% 
Upper Denkyira West 24.2% 20.8% 37.1% 33.4% 
Wassa Amenfi West 21.7% 20.4% 35.5% 29.9% 
 
Results of indemnity payments at the village level for coverage at the 50 and 70 percent 
levels are presented in table 10. In this example for fair-market premiums, the average indemnity 
payment was equal to the premium paid by the farmers. This study uses an exchange rate of $1 
USD = 1.89 GHC. This value was computed by taking the average daily exchange rate from 
September 1, 2012 to February 28, 2013. This timeframe was used because it was the harvest 
period for the main crop. This study assumed that 64 kg bags of cocoa beans were purchased for 
2012-2013 producer price of 212 GHC, resulting in a value of $1.77 USD kg
-1
 at the farm gate. 
In most instances, non-CSC producers were paying higher premiums than CSC producers. CSC 
producers paid higher premiums than non-CSC producers in seven of the 19 districts: (1) 
Akyemansa, (2) Aowin Suaman, (3) Birim North, (4) Birim South, (5) Bosome Freho, (6) Upper 
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Denkyira West, and (7) Wassa Amenfi West. However, these higher premiums purchased higher 
insured yields. Because the insured yields of CSC and non-CSC producers differ, it is difficult to 
compare them directly. For instance for Catastrophic (50%) coverage in Akyemansa, the average 
indemnity payment for non-CSC producers was less than CSC producers at $28.42 USD and 
$29.77 USD, respectively. However, the value of the insured yield for non-CSC producers was 
$220.33 USD (124.48 kg * $1.77) and $275.04 USD (155.39 kg * $1.77) for CSC producers. A 
normalized value can be obtained by dividing indemnity payment by insured value. This 
normalized value, expressed as indemnity as a percent of insured yield is 12.90 percent and 
10.82 percent for non-CSC and CSC producers, respectively. The normalization showed that 
even when CSC producers had higher indemnity payments than non-CSC producers, they still 




Table 10. Average indemnity payments per hectare at the district level 
 
50 Percent 70 Percent 
  Non-CSC CSC Non-CSC CSC 
Adansi South $27.29 $26.79 $55.93 $59.13 
Ahafo Ano South $26.46 $26.36 $56.02 $57.65 
Akyemansa $28.42 $29.77 $56.29 $61.44 
Aowin Suaman $26.42 $26.66 $57.54 $58.71 
Asin North $28.41 $28.35 $58.02 $60.20 
Asunafo North $26.72 $24.69 $58.54 $55.62 
Asunafo South $25.81 $25.77 $55.95 $56.93 
Asutifi $24.59 $23.35 $53.14 $53.47 
Atwima Nwabiagya $33.80 $31.86 $66.57 $67.65 
Bia $28.87 $23.27 $60.61 $53.95 
Bibiani  Awiaso Bekwia $25.31 $22.54 $55.82 $53.72 
Birim North $27.30 $28.61 $54.32 $60.84 
Birim South $27.51 $30.00 $55.24 $60.25 
Bosome Freho $23.57 $26.49 $50.45 $57.31 
Juaboso $27.12 $23.03 $59.21 $53.69 
Sefwi Akontombra $29.53 $26.56 $61.17 $59.36 
Sefwi Wiawso $26.31 $27.74 $56.45 $59.73 
Upper Denkyira West $27.70 $27.23 $57.40 $59.12 
Wassa Amenfi West $24.81 $26.63 $54.91 $59.03 




An alternative way to compare premiums is to look at the cost of the fair-market premium 
(table 10) in comparison to the average revenue of cocoa produced. For this study, CSC and non-
CSC producers are assumed to have equal costs. The average revenue of cocoa was the average 
yield (table 6) multiplied by the producer price of cocoa ($1.77 USD). The results of the 
premium as a percent of average cocoa value are presented in table 11. In all cases, premiums 
paid for CSC producers were a smaller percent of cocoa revenue than non-CSC producers. For 
catastrophic coverage of 50 percent, a farmer in Juaboso was estimated to pay 3.3 percent of 
average cocoa value to obtain coverage. A non-CSC producer in the same district would pay 4.9 
percent of expected cocoa value for the same coverage. The highest percentage that any CSC 
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producer would pay for basic (50 percent) coverage was 6 percent in Birim South. These 
percentages are very low because: (1) the fair-market premium being used did not take 
administrative and operational costs of the insurance program into consideration which 
conservatively accounts for 20 percent of insurance premium for maize in the USA (Babcock & 
Cox, 2012) and (2) the estimation is based on revenues rather than profit. However, this study 
assumes that input costs are equal between CSC and non-CSC producers because each group 
uses inorganic fertilizer. 
 
Table 11. Premium as percent of average cocoa revenue 
 
50 Percent 70 Percent 
  Non-CSC CSC Non-CSC CSC 
Adansi South 5.6% 4.4% 11.5% 9.8% 
Ahafo Ano South 5.2% 4.2% 11.1% 9.1% 
Akyemansa 6.4% 5.4% 12.8% 11.2% 
Aowin Suaman 4.8% 3.9% 10.5% 8.6% 
Asin North 5.9% 4.8% 12.1% 10.1% 
Asunafo North 4.8% 3.6% 10.6% 8.1% 
Asunafo South 4.9% 3.9% 10.7% 8.7% 
Asutifi 4.7% 3.6% 10.1% 8.2% 
Atwima Nwabiagya 7.0% 5.6% 13.8% 11.8% 
Bia 5.2% 3.4% 11.0% 7.9% 
Bibiani  Awiaso Bekwia 4.8% 3.5% 10.6% 8.3% 
Birim North 6.3% 5.3% 12.6% 11.3% 
Birim South 6.8% 6.0% 13.7% 12.0% 
Bosome Freho 5.6% 5.1% 11.9% 11.1% 
Juaboso 4.9% 3.3% 10.7% 7.8% 
Sefwi Akontombra 5.5% 4.0% 11.4% 9.0% 
Sefwi Wiawso 4.9% 4.2% 10.6% 9.1% 
Upper Denkyira West 5.9% 4.6% 12.1% 10.0% 







Another way to compare CSC and non-CSC producers is to consider risk. In this model the 
risk was the dispersion of the simulated yield ha
-1
, or the standard deviation of the results. 
However, because the mean yield of the two groups – CSC and non-CSC – was not equal the 
regression error term must be normalized to have a fair comparison of risk. This normalization 




𝜇𝜆⁄       (13) 
 
Where the coefficient of variation, (Cvλ) is equal to the ratio of the standard deviation (σλ) – 
yield per hectare – to the mean (μλ) – yield per hectare – for the λ
th 
location. Relative standard 
deviation (RSD) is the absolute value of the coefficient of variation multiplied by 100 to be 
expressed as a percentage. Lower percentages equate to lower yield risk. Table 12 shows the 
results of RSD values for CSC and non-CSC producers. In every district, CSC producers have 
lower RSD (less risk) than non-CSC. The difference between non-CSC and CSC ranges from 
four percent in Bosome Freho to ten percent in Juaboso with an average difference of seven 
percent. These results indicate that CSC practices reduce risk in cocoa production in the 
observed locations. The primary reason for the observed decrease in yield risk is a result of the 
higher yields obtained through CSC practices. In addition, the standard deviations for yield 
shown in table 6 were not substantially different for non-CSC and CSC producers which also 
influence RSD. However, the largest driver of RSD reduction for CSC producers were the higher 




Table 12. Relative standard deviation for CSC and non-CSC  
  Non-CSC CSC 
Adansi South 61% 55% 
Ahafo Ano South 60% 53% 
Akyemansa 65% 60% 
Aowin Suaman 57% 51% 
Asin North 63% 56% 
Asunafo North 58% 50% 
Asunafo South 59% 52% 
Asutifi 58% 51% 
Atwima Nwabiagya 70% 64% 
Bia 59% 50% 
Bibiani Awiaso Bekwia 59% 51% 
Birim North 68% 60% 
Birim South 70% 63% 
Bosome Freho 65% 61% 
Juaboso 59% 49% 
Sefwi Akontombra 60% 53% 
Sefwi Wiawso 59% 53% 
Upper Denkyira West 63% 56% 
Wassa Amenfi West 59% 53% 
 
Although this study has been analyzing the costs of insuring non-CSC compared with CSC, it 
was not the intent to insure farmers who do not participate in the CSC practices. Rather, 
insurance was to be used to help mitigate the perceived risks of following CSC practices such as 
additional expenses of farm inputs such as inorganic fertilizer. As such, a better comparison is to 
look at the expected gross revenue of non-CSC producers who do not have crop insurance as 
compared to CSC producers who do have crop insurance. Because both CSC and non-CSC 
producers are using inorganic fertilizer, costs are assumed to be equal between the two groups. 
The expected gross revenue of non-CSC producers was: 
 





and the expected gross  revenue of CSC producers was: 
 
𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒̂ 𝐶𝑆𝐶 = (𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 ∗ 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑 ) + (𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑 ∗ 𝑔𝑎𝑝𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑) − 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑟 𝑚𝑘𝑡 (15) 
 
The difference between the gross revenue of the two groups was that CSC producers paid 
premiums for insurance and any CSC producer who had a yield below the insured yield received 
an indemnity payment to compensate for the loss. The results of this analysis are presented in 
table 13. The results were based on the simulated yields for each district.  
 
Table 13. Gross Revenue per hectare of insurance for CSC and non-CSC producers  
  Non-CSC CSC CSC Gain 
Adansi South $487.05  $605.05  $118.00  
Ahafo Ano South $506.74  $630.66  $123.92  
Akyemansa $440.68  $550.08  $109.40  
Aowin Suaman $548.82  $681.40  $132.58  
Asin North $479.98  $593.61  $113.63  
Asunafo North $554.21  $689.67  $135.46  
Asunafo South $524.05  $657.59  $133.54  
Asutifi $526.59  $649.37  $122.78  
Atwima Nwabiagya $480.68  $573.17  $92.49  
Bia $550.13  $682.95  $132.82  
Bibiani Awiaso Bekwia $528.16  $649.73  $121.57  
Birim North $430.39  $539.12  $108.73  
Birim South $402.49  $500.37  $97.88  
Bosome Freho $423.58  $517.97  $94.39  
Juaboso $553.55  $690.38  $136.83  
Sefwi Akontombra $536.40  $661.38  $124.98  
Sefwi Wiawso $532.00  $653.97  $121.97  
Upper Denkyira West $473.33  $591.10  $117.77  




In every instance, crop insurance under CSC production has higher revenue gains than non-
CSC production. CSC producers have expected returns of at least $92.50 USD ha
-1
 (Atwima 
Nwabiagya) more than non-CSC producers. On average, CSC producer will have higher returns 
of $119.02 USD ha
-1
 and as much as $136.83 USD ha
-1
 (Juaboso). Given that the average 
income revenue of a non-CSC producer was $ 500.33 USD, the average gain of $119.02 USD 
represents a gain of 23.79 percent of the non-CSC producers’ simulated revenue. The returns for 
CSC producers were equal at both coverage levels – 50, and 70 percent – because in this 
example we use a fair-market premium where premium equals average indemnity payment with 
no transaction or overhead costs figured into the premium. These results show that even if the 
CSC producers were to pay for the crop insurance they would have higher returns than non-CSC 
producers based on the assumption of a fair-market premium (premium = indemnity).  
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V. Summary and Conclusions 
A. Summary 
The objectives of this study were: (1) to estimate yield differences among cocoa producers 
who follow CSC and non-CSC practices in Ghana (2) estimate the impact of CSC practices on 
risk using percent chance of indemnity payments to producers and relative standard deviation as 
measurements, and (3) investigate potential revenue gains through following CSC practices. This 
investigation was done through regression analysis and simulations of regression results for 
individual districts in Ghana. This study looked specifically at the differences in cocoa yield, 
insured yield, yield gaps, probability of indemnity payment, price of average indemnity, 
premium payment as a percent of expected revenue, relative standard deviation, and revenue 
gains for purchasing insurance for CSC producers and non-CSC producers. Simulations were 
generated using an estimated yield regression model for cocoa that was estimated using a sample 
of 1,200 Ghanaian farmers over two main harvest seasons. 
 
B. Results and Recommendations 
Producers who followed CSC practices were estimated to have higher yields in each district 
than those producers who did not follow CSC practices. On average results indicated higher 
yields of 96.68 kg ha
-1
 for producers who follow CSC practices. Results of simulations also show 
higher yields for producers who follow CSC practices although this result is less at 67.24 kg ha
-1
. 
CSC practices reduced yield risk for producers in every district. The largest contributor to this 
was the statistically significant yield gains obtained by following CSC practices. Producer 
training resulted in yield gains in this study. The largest increase in yield from training was a 
result of increased yield from inorganic fertilizer use. Most likely this gain is a result of better 
timing and more precise application amounts of inorganic fertilizer as a result of training. 
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However, data on dates applied and amounts applied for fertilizer were not available in this study 
to know for certain. In addition, producers who have undergone training may have better access 
(financial and physical) to agronomic inputs than producers who have not undergone any 
training. Better physical access is the result of the network of the training program making the 
agronomic inputs available and better financial access is the result of producers who have 
completed training being given access to credit when needed. The training that was used for this 
study was the inupt promoter (IP) training program from the WCF’s CLP. This training is similar 
to the proposed training for CSC because it trains farmers on input use and provides financial 
credit to those who have completed training. In addition, CSC aims to provide crop insurance for 
producers who follow CSC practices. Because the training proposed for CSC involves pest and 
disease management while also providing access to agronomic inputs, it is likely that the training 
proposed by CSC will further reduce yield risk for producers.  
To further guarantee reductions in yield risk, a WII policy should be offered rather than a 
MPCI policy. By offering a WII policy, adverse selection and moral hazard are eliminated. 
Because indemnities would only be paid in the event of unfavorable weather, producers would 
have incentives to continue with best practices on their farms. Conversely, if a producer had a 
MPCI policy they would not have incentive to manage diseases and pests with best management 
practices because the MPCI policy would cover their losses. This reduces yields and makes the 
insurance program more expensive to operate. The models used for this study were more suitable 
to WII because they did not assume any of the additional risk associated with MPCI policies 
resulting from adverse selection and moral hazard. Although some of the perils that are of great 
concern to Ghanaian producers (black pod and CSSV) would not be covered by a WII product, 
the training associated with complying with CSC practices will enhance prevention and 
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management techniques of the producers to these perils.  Furthermore, the effectiveness of the 
training could be reduced by moral hazard if those perils were covered by the insurance product. 
The most important reason for recommending WII over MPCI is the substantial cost savings 
through the reduction of operational and transaction costs and the elimination of adverse 
selection and moral hazard. 
Shade management was included in CSC practices for this study. Shade management is an 
important aspect of CSC because carbon transactions such as those offered in REDD+, can be 
acquired by using shade management and could offset the cost of insurance premiums for 
producers. In addition to carbon transactions, the crop insurance premium for CSC producers 
could be offset by private-sector funding.  This study found that producers who practiced shade 
management had higher yields of 42.51 kg ha
-1
. Although these results opposite of some 
previous literature (Ahenkorah et al., 1974; Gockowski & Sonwa, 2008, 2011; Murray, 1954) it 
has the same results as a forthcoming publication in Ghana (R. Asare et al., n.d.). The conflicting 
results of previous and present studies warrants more investigation into the relationship between 
shade management and cocoa yields.  
Finally, CSC producers were found to have higher gross revenue than non-CSC producers. 
On average, CSC producer had higher gross returns of $119.02 USD ha
-1
. The largest difference 
in gross returns between CSC and non-CSC producers was in Juaboso where there was a total 
difference of $136.83 USD ha
-1
. Along with having the highest gain in gross revenue, Juaboso 
also had the highest simulated yield (390.05 kg ha
-1
), the highest yield difference to non-CSC 
(77.31 kg ha
-1
), and the lowest standard error (lowest yield risk) from the regression (35.15 kg 
ha
-1
). Crop insurance appeared to be an economically viable option for CSC producers. The 
normalized yield distribution and the percent chance of an indemnity payment being distributed 
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were reduced for the producers who followed the recommended practices of CSC while 
concurrently raising average yields. The holistic approach of CSC can mitigate forest 
degradation and deforestation. Giving producers access to credit and inputs to increase yields 
alone does not guarantee that producers will reduce expansive practices. The additional benefit 
of crop insurance as part of CSC practices should play a vital role in decreasing forest 
degradation and deforestation.   
 
C. Limitations 
 The amount of data collected and analyzed in this study makes it distinctive. Previous 
studies investigating cocoa yields at the household level used smaller samples. A study 
conducted by Edwin and Masters (2005) which investigated genetic improvements and yield 
gains in Ghana had a sample size of 192 and another study conducted by Norton et al. (2014) 
which investigated the impact of farmer training schools had a sample size of 183. The CLP data 
in this study are temporally limited (only two years), however, the countrywide breadth 
(location) of the observations makes it one of the most extensive datasets for studying West 
African cocoa. 
 Although the data of this study were extensive, the yield model – with an R
2
 value of 0.24 – 
developed from the data did not have enough explanatory power to confidently write insurance 
policies. With a root mean square error of 201.4 kg ha
-1
, much of the variation in the simulated 
yields came from the error term of the model. More accurate data are needed to increase the R
2
 
and consequently the explanatory power of the model. Some key areas of improvement would 
be: (1) GPS-measured farm size instead of self-reported farm size, (2) quantities of agro-
chemical use rather than binary (yes/no) variables, (3) specific measurement of canopy cover for 
shade management rather than producers’ response, and (4) more temporal observations. Lastly, 
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the two variables that were most important in defining CSC practices, IP training and shade 
management, were not present or not completed for the baseline survey. The question for hade 
management was not included in the survey and there were no producers who had completed 
training during the baseline study.  The quality of the study would be enhanced if more temporal 
observations that included these two variables were available. 
 
D. Future Research 
Writing accurate insurance policies requires an immense amount of data. Accurate daily 
weather data are already available in Ghana as 9
2
 km grid cells and if cocoa crop insurance were 
to be offered in the future, the accuracy of yield data would be certain to increase. The data were 
limiting in this study but the initial findings were very promising in regards to economic viability 
of cocoa crop insurance at the farm level in Ghana. This topic should be revisited in the future as 
new temporal observations become available. In addition, future studies should investigate 
funding mechanisms and allocation of resources for CSC, Ghana-specific transaction and 
operational costs of managing a WII product, and lastly the economic sustainability of an 
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C. Data Cleaning Procedure 
Appendix 3. Data cleaning procedure 
Created By: Justin D. McKinley  
Date: April 21, 2014 
This document outlines the procedure in which yield data – 
obtained from the World Cocoa Foundation’s Cocoa 
Livelihood Program – was cleaned prior to analysis. The 
cleaning was conducted in three major parts: CLP input 
errors, land size outliers, and finally yield outliers. The 
procedures are outlined in detail in the following sections. 
CLP Input Errors 
There are three different training programs that a farmer can 
attend through the CLP. These programs are Farmer Field 
School (FFS), Farmer Business School, (FBS), and Input 
Training (IP). When a farmer finishes IP training they are 
then qualified to receive inputs from the CLP program. There 
were some discrepancies in the original data to be controlled 
for; five in total. To fix these issues, five new variables were 
created using SAS and the values were adjusted according. A 
table of how the data was handled is shown below: 
 
************************************************* 
* NewVar FFS FBS IP CLP ASSUME * 
* fix1  0 0 0 1 CLP=0  * 
* fix2  1 0 0 1 CLP=0  * 
* fix3  0 1 0 1 CLP=0  * 
* fix4  1 1 0 1 IP=1    * 
* fix5  0 1 1 1 FFS=0  * 
************************************************** 
 
In the above table, 0=no and 1=yes. FFS, FBS, and IP are as 
previously defined and CLP is a binary variable for whether 
or not the farmer received inputs from the CLP program. The 
last column is the assumption that was made based off of the 
five problem scenarios that were identified. For example, the 
variable fix1 corrects the error in which a farmer claims CLP 
inputs but has not conducted any of the training. This is 
impossible because a farmer is required to attend IP training 
prior to obtaining CLP inputs. We assume in this case that 
there was an entry error and that CLP should not be equal to 
one (yes) but rather CLP should be equal to zero (no). Other 
assumptions are shown in the table above. 
Farm Size Outliers 
Next, outliers were identified based upon farm size. An initial 
box plot identified an extreme outlier at more than 2,000 




outliers were removed directly with 50 hectares as the cutoff 
point. After all farmers with farm size greater than 50 hectares 
removed, descriptive statistics were to determine the mean 
and standard deviation of farm size. 
Yield Outliers 
Working with observations that had already been corrected 
for CLP-input errors and farm size, attention focused on 
outliers based on yield. Extreme outliers were also identified 
in this data set with some farmers claiming yields well beyond 
the feasible range for cocoa, even in research settings. To 
remove these observations (likely an error that occurred from 
farm size being understated) observations were deleted that 
had yield in excess of 2,000 kg/ha for the main yield and 
2,500 kg/ha for total yield. Observations were removed for 
both scenarios. These yields are considered a maximum 
feasible in most any part of the world and represent the 
physical constraints of the cocoa tree.  
With the sample restricted to observations with main yield < 
2,000 kg/ha and total yield < 2,500 kg/ha, descriptive 
statistics were calculated. Yield differences are expected 
between location (by country) and whether the farmer uses 
chemical fertilizer. By analyzing statistics with both chemical 
fertilizer use and country as class variables, it was decided to 
set upper limits on yield constraints for four different 
scenarios: Ghana with fertilizer and Ghana with no fertilizer. 
As such, these two groups were created and each was 
restricted individually by again taking two standard deviations 
above the mean of each group. Finally, the four groups were 
merged in to one data set.  
Results 
The final sample for yield modeling has a 1,143 observations 
in Côte d’Ivoire and 1,211 in Ghana with maximum yields of 
1,007 kg/ha in Côte d’Ivoire and 1,186 kg/ha in Ghana. These 
values are in line with expected feasible maximum yields for 
Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire where average yields are 400 kg ha 
-
1
 and 800 kg ha 
-1







D. USDA Glossary 
Appendix 4. Glossary of Relevant Risk Management Terms (USDA, 2011) 
Actual Production History (APH). Actual Production History is the most common plan of 
insurance under the Multiple Peril Crop Insurance, or MPCI, umbrella. It is the basis for 
determining your guarantee under either multi-peril crop insurance or revenue insurance policies. 
The APH is calculated as a 4- to 10-year simple average of your actual yield on the insured land. 
If you do not have records of actual yields, a “transitional yield” based on average yields in your 
county is used.  
 
Buy-up coverage. This refers to crop insurance coverage that exceeds the CAT (catastrophic) 
level. Coverage is available up to 75 percent of your expected yield or expected revenue (which 
is yield times price). In some areas, coverage up to 85 percent is available for some crops. You 
pay part of the premium, but government premium subsidy rates are now over 50 percent for 
most levels of coverage. 
 
CAT coverage. CAT is short for “catastrophic,” and refers to crop insurance coverage at the 
lowest, or catastrophic level. CAT coverage is set at the 50/55 level, which means that your yield 
must fall below 50 percent of your average yield before a loss is paid. These losses are paid at a 
rate of 55 percent of the highest price election. You must pay an administrative fee to become 
eligible to receive CAT coverage, but the government pays the entire premium. 
Crop Revenue Coverage (CRC). CRC is the most widely available revenue protection policy. 
This policy guarantees an amount of revenue (based on your actual production history (APH) x 
commodity price), called the final guarantee. Crop revenue insurance. Crop revenue insurance 
pays you indemnities based on gross revenue shortfalls instead of just yield or price shortfalls. 
Types of crop revenue insurance includes Crop Revenue Coverage (CRC), Revenue Assurance 
(RA) and Income Protection (IP). These programs are subsidized and reinsured by the USDA’s 
Risk Management Agency. 
 
Crop yield insurance. Also known as Actual Production History (APH) yield, crop yield 
insurance pays indemnities to producers when yields fall below the producer’s insured yield 
level due to most natural causes. Crop yield insurance is subsidized by the USDA’s Risk 
Management Agency. 
 
Disaster payments. These are direct payments to farmers on an emergency basis when crop 
yields are abnormally low due to adverse growing conditions. During the 1970s, there was a 
“standing” disaster payments program, with payments made without declaration of a disaster 
area. Regular payments ceased after 1981, but since then ad hoc disaster payments have been 
specially approved by the U.S. Congress on a number of occasions. 
 
Multiple Peril Crop Insurance (MPCI). MPCI was established in the 1930s to cover yield 
losses from most natural causes. MPCI operated on a somewhat limited basis up through the 
early 1980s, when a private/public partnership was established. At that point, insurance 
availability was greatly expanded and premium subsidies increased in hopes of replacing the 
disaster payment program. Major reforms legislated in 1994—introduction of a low-cost CAT 
(catastrophic) coverage level, increased premium subsidies, and a requirement that participants 
in other farm programs obtain crop insurance—increased participation to over 200 million acres, 
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covering the majority of acres of major field crops planted in the United States. 
 
Premium. The amount of money you pay for risk protection. Option buyers pay a premium to 
option sellers for an options contract. Similarly, the person who buys an insurance policy pays a 
premium in order to obtain coverage. 
 
Revenue Assurance (RA). Revenue Assurance provides coverage to protect you against loss of 
revenue caused by low prices, low yields, or a combination of both. 
Reinsurance. A method of transferring some of an insurer’s risk to other parties. In the case of 
Federal crop insurance, USDA’s Risk Management Agency shares the risk of loss with private 
insurance companies that deliver policies to producers. Private reinsurance also exists. In this 
case, a private reinsurer assumes responsibility for a share of the risk, in return for a share of the 
premiums. 
 
Revenue insurance. Revenue insurance, a cousin to MPCI, was introduced after the 1994 
reforms and has become the most popular form of insurance in some areas. Whereas crop 
insurance covers only yield losses, revenue insurance pays when gross revenue (yield times 
price) falls below a specified level. These programs are subsidized and reinsured by the Risk 
Management Agency. 
 
Risk. Uncertainty about outcomes that are not equally desirable. Risk is an important aspect of 
the farming business. The uncertainties of weather, yields, prices, government policies, global 
markets, and other factors can cause wide swings in farm income. Risk management involves 
choosing among alternatives that reduce the financial effects of such uncertainties.  
 
Subsidy. Money given by the government to help producers function. 
 
Trigger yield. Under GRP, farmers receive payments any time the actual county yield drops 
below the trigger yield that the farmer chooses. The trigger yield can be 90, 85, 80, 75, or 70 
percent of the expected county yield, which is based on the county's yield history since 1962. 
Expected county yields are adjusted for upward trends. 
 
Uncertainty. Lack of sure knowledge or predictability. 
 
Yield. The amount of something, especially a crop, produced by cultivation or labor. 
 
The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) prohibits discrimination in all its programs and 
activities on the basis of race, color, national origin, age, disability, and where applicable, sex, 
1400 Independence Avenue, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20250-9410 or call (800) 795-3272 (voice) 
or (202) 720-6382 (TDD). USDA is an equal opportunity provider and employer. 
 
United States Department of Agriculture 






E. Clarification of shade management 
Appendix 5 Shade Clarification: Personal Correspondence with Edwin Afari, WCF  
Shade management depends on the age of cocoa trees. For productive trees we are looking at the 
number of mature forest trees with height above 12m and dbh of >30cm that provide adequate 
canopy cover for cocoa trees. And for young cocoa trees we are looking at using plantain/banana 
and other crops to provide shade cover. 
  
1.       Number of trees per ha matters – Shade tree count  (12-16 per ha) 
2.       Species of Trees 
3.       Pruning of trees 
4.       Amount of Shade cover 
5.       Canopy Cover 
6.       Placement of trees 
7.       Removal if there [is] excess shade. Cutting and ringing 
 
